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INTRODUCTION

On January 12, 1991, the United States Congress authorized President Bush to initiate hostile action using armed forces in the Persian
Gulf.1 During the earlier buildup of forces in the Gulf, President Bush
had asserted, like many presidents before him, that he needed no congressional authorization or declaration of war. He, as commander-inchief, could constitutionally order American military personnel to
fight.2 Indeed, even as he asked for explicit congressional support for
the use of force in the Gulf, President Bush refused to concede that
such approval was constitutionally required.'
Only a few weeks earlier, on December 13, 1990, Judge Harold

Greene had denied injunctive relief sought by fifty-four members of the
House of Representatives and one senator prohibiting President Bush
from commencing war in the Persian Gulf without explicit congressional approval.4 Unlike most courts faced with lawsuits involving the
constitutional allocation of war powers between Congress and the Pres-

ident, Judge Greene boldly ruled that the issue did not present a political question and hence would, if appropriately postured, be justiciable.5
Moreover, unlike the majority of courts which have decided whether
congressional plaintiffs should be able to sue in their capacities as
members of Congress, he ruled that the congressional plaintiffs neither
lacked standing nor were equitably barred from obtaining relief.'
1. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 102-1,
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 3.
2. See Excerpts: The Great Debate on War Powers, NAT'L L.J.,
Jan. 21, 1991, at 26; see
also Hearings on U.S. Policy in the PersianGulf Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 107, 109 (1990) (testimony of Secretary of State James Baker) [hereinafter Hearings].
3. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 107, 109.
4. See Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1152 (D.D.C. 1990).
5. See id. at 1141-46. An amicus brief by 11 constitutional and international law scholars
argued, similarly, that questions concerning the constitutional allocation of the war-making power
were justiciable and should, in a proper case, be addressed by the court. The law professors' brief
took no position on whether the case before Judge Greene was properly postured. See Bruce A.
Ackerman et al., Ronald v. Dellums v. George Bush (D.D.C. 1990): Memorandum Amicus Curiae
of Law Professors, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 257 (1991).
6. Numerous lawsuits challenging presidential exercise of war powers as unauthorized by
Congress have been dismissed as political questions. See Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political
Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976). For a recent example, see Ange v. Bush, 752 F.
Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990). Of some niffe lawsuits involving congressional plaintiffs, two were dismissed for lack of standing and on political question grounds. See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484
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Nonetheless, Judge Greene denied the injunction on the ground that
the matter was not ripe for adjudication because a majority of Congress had not chosen to confront the executive by officially indicating
7

their desire to play a role in declaring or authorizing the Gulf War.

Judge Greene's ruling was the most recent in a series of more than
forty decisions dating back to the 1970s in which courts wrestled with
the question of whether and when to entertain lawsuits by congres-

sional plaintiffs. Congressional plaintiffs are frequently the only ones

with the motivation and wherewithal 8 to prosecute such suits, which
often raise critical issues concerning the constitutional allocation of
powers between Congress and the executive. 9 Yet courts fear they will
F.2d 1307 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 1321 (1973); Gravel v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C.
1972). Another two were dismissed on equitable discretion grounds. Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F.
Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987) (also citing political question grounds); Conyers v. Reagan, 578 F.
Supp. 324 (D.D.C. 1984), vacated as moot, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Four were dismissed
on purely political question grounds. See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (dismissing as moot separate claim that concerned the Boland Amendment); Crockett v.
Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (dismissing Foreign Assistance Act claim
pursuant to court's equitable discretion), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984); Mitchell v. Laird,
488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 854 (D. Mass. 1973). The ninth
case, Dellums, was dismissed pursuant to a particular branch of ripeness doctrine articulated by
Justice Powell in Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). See infra part III.B.
7. Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1149-52. Official action may include passage of a law or joint
resolution, or a relevant majority joining or authorizing a lawsuit.
8. Congressional plaintiffs are far more knowledgeable about executive activities in derogation of congressional authority than are members of the public. Congressional plaintiffs are also in
a better position to challenge executive activities when such challenges are likely to be meaningful.
Indeed, in some instances members of Congress will be the only ones with a sufficiently specific
injury to gain standing. See, e.g., Richardson v. Kennedy, 313 F. Supp. 1282 (W.D. Pa. 1970)
(holding that taxpayer who claimed unconstitutional delegation of power to set congressional salaries lacked standing).
9. Of the more than 40 such suits, nine involved the specific allocation of war powers. See
supra note 6. Nine involved the allocation of treaty-making and other foreign affairs-related powers. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Dornan v. United States Secretary of Defense,
851 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United Presbyterian Church v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Daughtry v. Carter, 584 F.2d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055
(D.C. Cir. 1978); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Harrington v. Schlesinger,
528 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1975); Burton v. Baker, 723 F. Supp. 1550 (D.D.C. 1989); Helms v.
Secretary of the Treasury, 721 F. Supp. 1354 (D.D.C. 1989). Six addressed the propriety of
appointments or discharge. See Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988); Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981); Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978); McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265 (D. Idaho), affd sub nom.
McClure v. Reagan, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981); Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973);
Williams v. Phillips, 360 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C. 1973). Four addressed executive vetoes and impoundment of allocated funds. See Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated as
moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v.
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become a forum to replay the political process, opening their doors to
members of Congress disappointed in the outcome of a legislative battle
or critical of executive action.10
In their efforts to strike an appropriate balance between these two
concerns, courts have mobilized the doctrines of standing, equitable discretion, and ripeness.1 At one extreme, then Judges Bork and Scalia
have argued that congressional plaintiffs should never be afforded
standing to sue in their official capacities. 12 Otherwise, they claim, an
unelected, unprincipled judiciary will encroach on the work of the two
democratically elected coordinate branches of government.' 3 At the
other extreme, 1 4 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir5 implied that the judiciary should entertain
cuit in Mitchell v. Laird"
Pierce, 697 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
10. Carl M. McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REV. 241,
263-64 (1981). See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL. THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
11. The courts have also declined to decide the merits of such suits by finding them to be
political questions. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1311 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974). Although the choice to avoid the merits has much to do with the
separation of powers issues which concern the courts in congressional plaintiff suits, political question determinations in no way rest on plaintiffs' status as members of Congress, and are thus not
treated in this article.
12. Both judges have contended that members of Congress should be denied standing because they suffer no injury different than that of the public when the executive acts unconstitutionally, and such injury is too remote and non-specific to support standing. See Moore v. United
States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985); Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1180 (D.C. Cir.)
(Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983). Both concede that standing exists when
a legislator's personal rights are in question. Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)
(involving a representative who challenged his own exclusion from the House).
13. The judges' concern with the unelected nature of the judiciary is misplaced where constitutional allocation of powers is at issue. The allocation of powers is constitutionally prescribed,
and neither the executive branch nor Congress has, by itself, the power to amend the Constitution.
See U.S. CONsT. art. V. Instead, the judiciary interprets it when a controversy arises concerning
its meaning. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
14. But see Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973).
15. 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973). To its credit, the Mitchell court focused on legislative
duties, rather than "legislator rights." Id. at 614. Several later cases, by framing the issue as that
of injury to legislators' rights, rather than injury to our democratic system, lend a cast to the
standing inquiry, suggesting that only those asserting their own private "rights" deserve standing.
See, e.g., Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 433-36 (D.C. Cir. 1974); McKinney v. United
States Dep't of the Treasury, 614 F. Supp. 1226, 1239-41 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), afd, 799 F.2d
1544 (Fed. Cir. 1986). But see Pressler v. Simon, 428 F. Supp. 302, 304 (D.D.C. 1976) (granting
Representative Pressler standing because he was "prevented from voting to perform a specific
legislative duty expressly mandated by the Constitution"), vacated on other grounds sub nom.
Pressler v. Blumenthal, 431 U.S. 169 (1977), and affd by subsequent order, 434 U.S. 1028
(1978). This ignores the tremendous importance of quasi-public and public law litigation in the
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virtually all such actions that "bear upon" the legislative duty to impeach, appropriate, or legislate. 16
The Bork and Scalia approach refuses to recognize for standing
purposes injury to the congressional role in our constitutional scheme.
In the name of preserving the balance of powers between the three
branches, their approach completely eradicates the role of the judiciary
in checking presidential encroachment on Congress' constitutionally
mandated role.17 Far from maintaining the balance of powers, the
courts would, by adopting the Bork and Scalia approach, actually tilt
the balance toward the executive." On the other hand, as most courts
quickly recognized, the Mitchell approach invited congressional endruns around the legislative process and threatened to involve the courts
in virtually every political dispute, because virtually all disputes can be
framed to implicate the impeachment or legislative duties of members
of Congress.' 9
Most courts have thus sought a middle ground that leaves room to
entertain some congressional lawsuits but avoids those cases that either
threaten to involve the courts in routine political battles or pose questions inappropriate for judicial resolution. While some courts have used
post-industrial world. See infra text accompanying notes 224-33; see also John H. Ely, Kuwait,
the Constitution, and the Courts: Two Cheers for Judge Greene, 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 1, 6
(1991) (suggesting that constitutional powers are not mere "perks," and that in such cases, the
fate of citizens affected by impediments to the exercise of congressional authority is at stake).
16. Mitchell, 488 F.2d at 614. Of course, virtually all congressional cases will raise issues
that "bear upon" either legislative or impeachment concerns. The Mitchell court dismissed as a
political question the plaintiff's challenge to the legality of the Vietnam War. Id. at 613, 616. The
court, nevertheless, described its grant of congressional standing broadly and indicated its willingness to decide other types of congressional suits. Id. at 613-14. Mitchell has been followed by
other courts of appeals but its "bear upon" language was expressly repudiated in Harrington v.
Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
17. The Framers knew very well that a single president could act more quickly and decisively than a collective body. Fearful of creating a powerful monarch, they carefully allocated
certain powers (such as initiating war) primarily to Congress, and required congressional approval
for the exercise of others (such as treaty-making and the appointment of officers and federal

judges). Regarding the allocation of war powers, see

DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 528 (Johnathan Elliott ed., 1866) (set-

ting forth James Wilson's view that "[tihis system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to
guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us
in such distress .. "). See also Jules Lobel, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution"The Transformation of the Original Understanding,in THE POLITICS OF LAW 273 (David Kairys ed., 1990).
18. Judicial refusal to entertain such suits does not operate symmetrically on both the executive and Congress, because of the executive's power simply to refuse to comply with or implement legislation. See infra part V.C.
19. See supra note 6; Harrington, 553 F.2d at 209.
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a flexible approach to standing to describe the middle ground, 2° many
others have looked to equitable principles or to the ripeness doctrine to
assess whether the case merits a hearing. Under the rubric of "equitable" or "remedial" discretion, some courts have held that if relief could
be obtained by further legislative action, courts should decline to entertain the congressional suit.21 Others have followed Justice Powell's concurrence in Goldwater v. Carter,22 and have held that until a relevant
20. See infra part II.B. Congressional standing typically turns on the first prong of the
Supreme Court's current four-part test: the requirement of injury-in-fact. The other requirements
include: (1) an interest within the zone of protected interests; (2) causation by the defendant's
wrongful action; and (3) a likelihood that the judicial action sought will remedy the wrong. Courts
using standing to describe the middle ground reject the notion that members of Congress never
suffer injuries different than injuries to the public, and accept notions of vote dilution, diminution
or nullification, and, in one instance, impeding committee work, as constituting injury-in-fact. See
infra notes 82-96 and accompanying text; see also American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Pierce,
697 F.2d 303, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (granting standing because executive action
impeded congressional committee work).
The standing inquiry, as a threshold determination, bars inquiry into the merits. See generally William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE LJ. 221 (1988). To avoid constitutionalizing the inquiry and barring plaintiffs at the initial stages, the court of appeals adopted the
equitable discretion approach, which emphasizes prudential rather than constitutional concerns in
assessing justiciability. See infra part III.A.
21. See Dornan v. United States Secretary of Defense, 851 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Humphrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Humphrey v. Brady, 488
U.S. 966 (1988); Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988); Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Moore v. United
States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106
(1985); Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983);
Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082
(1981); Burton v. Baker, 723 F. Supp. 1550 (D.D.C. 1989); Helms v. Secretary of the Treasury,
721 F. Supp. 1354 (D.D.C. 1989); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), a fdper
curiam, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984).
The "equitable discretion" doctrine was developed by and has been largely confined to the
D.C. Circuit. Its origins are generally traced to Judge Carl McGowan's famous article, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REV. 241 (1981), but early roots may be found in a
1974 Yale Law JournalNote arguing that courts should abandon the standing inquiry and instead
use prudential and non-constitutional doctrines to handle congressional plaintiff suits. See Note,
Standing to Sue for Members of Congress, 83 YALE. L.J. 1665 (1974); see also Note, Congressional Access to the Federal Courts, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1632 (1977).
Among the criticisms of the equitable discretion doctrine are that (1) it gives the courts
unfettered and unprincipled room to select among cases those that it wants to take (a criticism
also aimed at standing doctrine), and (2) it is incoherent because further congressional action is
always theoretically available to remedy the problem. See R. Lawrence Dessem, Congressional
Standing to Sue: Whose Vote Is This Anyway?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 9-13 (1986). Indeed,
the doctrine cannot explain those cases which are generally agreed to have been properly entertained-the "pocket veto" cases-because they too could have been remedied by further legislative action repassing the legislation.
22. 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
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majority 23 of Congress expresses its disagreement with executive action
there is no confrontation between the branches and the matter is not
ripe for court intervention. Judge Greene adopted this latter approach
in Dellums when he held that until Congress as a whole acted to confront the President concerning his actions in the Gulf, judicial intervention was inappropriate.24
The primary weakness in the equitable discretion and ripeness approaches is that one can always frame congressional-executive disputes
over allocation and exercise of powers as ones between fellow legislators, and thus suggest that further legislative action might offer relief.2 5
In theory, Congress can always enact statutes, reassert, or clarify previously passed acts or resolutions. Also, proponents of this approach have
failed to reconcile it with the "pocket veto" cases, in which courts
reached the merits despite the fact that the statutes could simply have
been passed again after Congress resumed its session. In the name of
avoiding a replay of the political process in the courts, the equitable
discretion doctrine forces that process to be repeatedly replayed in
Congress.2" And, like the ripeness approach, it fails to explain why it
23. A majority may not be strictly necessary. In Goldwater, Justice Powell stated that
"each branch" must "take[] action asserting its constitutional authority" before a court may consider a dispute between the President and Congress. Id. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring). Nevertheless, the numbers needed to "assert authority" may vary according to the nature of the question.
For example, in a treaty or senatorial confirmation case, a vote of one-third of the Senate plus one
additional vote-the number necessary to block executive action if Senate approval were constitutionally required-would be sufficient to create the requisite confrontation with the executive.
24. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1151 (D.D.C. 1990).
25. At least one commentator has noted this problem. See Dessem, supra note 21, at 10.
26. This is precisely what happened in a number of contexts. See, e.g., Lowrey v. Reagan,
676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987) (declining on equitable discretion grounds to determine the applicability of the War Powers Resolution to reflagging Kuwaiti tankers); Conyers v. Reagan, 578
F. Supp. 324 (D.D.C. 1984) (declining on equitable discretion grounds to determine the applicability of the War Powers Resolution to the invasion of Grenada), afl'd on other grounds, 765 F.2d
1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Congress thereafter entertained new efforts to amend the Resolution to
clarify that it was intended to apply to such situations. See Stephen Kurkjian, Debate Looms over
Foreign Policy, Bosro GLOBE, Feb. 6, 1989, at 3 (describing efforts to change the War Powers
Resolution after repeated executive non-compliance); Steven V. Roberts, War Powers? What War
Powers?, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 6, 1987, at A32 (describing problems with the War Powers Resolution
and the Lowry lawsuit, and quoting one expert as stating that "Congress should not have to pass a
new law in order to enforce a law already on the books"); Stephen J. Solarz, Missing the Point on
War Powers, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 28, 1987, at A31 (characterizing an effort to alter War Powers
Resolution procedures as "a kind of tacit Congressional complicity in the President's refusal" to
comply with the Resolution). In Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), affd per
curiam, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984), the district court
declined, under equitable discretion, to determine whether El Salvador should receive aid, despite
that country's gross abuses of human rights, which violated the Foreign Assistance Act. Id. at
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should be necessary to muster a congressional majority willing to reaffirm what the ratifiers adopted. Whether or not a current congressional
majority would agree to reenact the present constitutional allocation of
power, neither Congress nor the President has the legal right to change
that distribution. Hesitating to dismiss the congressional plaintiffs, but
rarely willing to reach the merits of their claims, the courts have allowed the executive to arrogate and Congress to abdicate constitutionally mandated powers and duties.
The story of congressional access to the courts thus has a
Kafkaesque quality. As soon as one door is left slightly ajar for plaintiffs to scramble through, another magically appears with a large "Do
Not Enter" sign.17 There is, however, a principled way for the courts to
permit congressional access faithful to the Constitution, while circumscribing the realm of judicial intervention in the business of politics.
Unfortunately, the courts have yet to articulate it. Both the courts and
members of Congress have a critical role in maintaining the constitutional balance of powers. When congressional plaintiffs bring claims
that fundamentally concern the constitutional allocation of powers between the executive and Congress, rather than those that primarily dispute statutory interpretation or the policy choices of fellow legislators,
the courts should entertain congressional lawsuits and recognize members of Congress as appropriate plaintiffs.
Current doctrine needs refinement. Reflecting a muddled standing
inquiry, the courts are almost evenly split in granting or denying standing to members of Congress.2 The courts must explicitly recognize that
when the executive usurps or undermines power constitutionally allocated to Congress, members of Congress are directly and palpably in902-03. It also declined on political question grounds to determine whether the War Powers Resolution applied. Id. at 896-901. Congress thereafter passed a bill requiring the President to certify
that El Salvador had made progress in human rights before it received aid, which President Reagan vetoed. See Bernard Gwertzman, Schultz Says House Panel Wants to "Walk Away"from
Salvador, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 7, 1984, at Al.
27. In each case, the courts employ a method they label "traditional" in an entirely new
way. Thus, although the standing doctrine's "central notion, injury in fact" was, in Judge McGowan's view, inadequate "to encompass our special rules of legislator standing," it was nevertheless employed to determine congressional access to the courts. See McGowan, supra note 10, at
255. Yet Judge McGowan pioneered deployment of a newly minted version of judicial discretion
against congressional access, one which proved an even more potent tool to avoid hearing such
cases on the merits. See discussion infra part III.A. And when standing and equitable discretion
seemed inadequate, "traditional" notions of ripeness were re-contoured to form a new hurdle for
congressional plaintiffs. See discussion infra part HII.
28. See Fletcher, supra note 20. For cases exhibiting split authority, see infra part II.
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jured. 29 By failing to recognize a distinct injury to the congressional

role, the standing inquiry sends courts looking for an injury to the interest of a legislator in this or that particular vote. The jurisdictional
inquiry should focus on the traditional standing concerns by ensuring
that a case is concrete and not advisory or collusive and that the parties
can present with sufficient clarity facts necessary for the court to adjudicate the matter. 30

Members of Congress should be granted standing whenever: (a)
the controversy is genuine and no advisory opinion is sought; (b) those
members possess sufficient information and proximity to the issue to
present the case adequately; and (c) the claim concerns executive usurpation of a specific function constitutionally accorded Congress.31
Neither the "equitable discretion" nor the ripeness approach de-

limits the appropriate role for the courts. Each excludes the judiciary
from the constitutional balance in those cases where it is most essential

that it exercise judicial review. By requiring Congress to muster a majority willing to assert its rights and role against a popular president,
who is often acting during a claimed emergency, the courts foster solo
and possibly precipitous presidential action even though the Constitution dictates that both branches play a role.32 It is precisely in areas
such as war powers, appointments of federal officers and judges and

treaty-making 33 that the Framers intended the inertia of the legislative

29. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, through its equitable discretion decisions,
has implicitly done so.
30. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 222. In my view, the standing inquiry should be limited
to the traditional constitutional concerns: Whether the controversy is live and real (not collusive or
seeking an advisory opinion), and whether the parties are sufficiently adverse and involved to
present the facts adequately to the court. See infra part V.
31. A grant of standing is appropriate when the claim is that the executive is usurping or
undermining the exercise of powers that are constitutionally accorded to Congress. When the
claim involves executive misinterpretation of a legislative act or unconstitutional action by fellow
legislators, which does not amount to wholly ceding to the executive Congress' constitutionally
mandated role, the court may appropriately deny standing because no true injury to the allocation
of powers is asserted.
As in all areas of law, there are gray areas. When executive "misinterpretation" of an act
deliberately amends, rewrites, or nullifies legislation, such "misinterpretation" may impede or undermine Congress' role and thus support a grant of standing. See infra note part V.A.
Likewise it may be difficult to determine whether legislative action is merely constitutionally
questionable or amounts to an abdication of legislative duty. These are, however, precisely the
types of determinations that courts make every day.
32. In addition, judicial refusal to entertain suits concerning the proper allocation of constitutional powers places Congress in the role of the judiciary; Congress is forced to interpret the
Constitution and then assert its own proper role.
33. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), of course, raised the question of whether the
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process to inhibit solo and possibly precipitous action in favor of deliberation, compromise and majority determination by the many and varied representatives of the people. The judiciary's refusal to interpret
and declare the proper constitutional roles of the other branches without an assertion of prerogative by a "relevant" 3 4 legislative majority
instead upsets the constitutional balance by allowing the legislature's
35
inertia to encourage executive action.
Indeed, the courts' wholesale refusal to adjudicate cases where the
constitutional balance is violated and yet no congressional majority can
be mustered allows, in effect, the political branches to amend the Constitution without following the requirements of Article V. Congress
could cede to the President the sole power to make war, make and
break treaties, appoint federal officers and the like simply by failing to
demand by a majority a role in these areas.
Moreover, when courts insist that congressional plaintiffs return to
their fellow legislators in instances in which a past majority has already
spoken (as for example through the War Powers Resolution or in legislation that the President has pocket vetoed) they simply force Congress
to replay the political process. That process may be vastly different as a
result of internal changes in congressional membership and external
changes of circumstance, thereby enabling the executive to "win" the
game of politics by making end-runs around clear constitutional provisions. Even when the political process produces the same result, the
American people have paid a price in wasted time and effort by our
already overburdened legislative representatives, in addition to other
costs associated with congressional activity.38
Framers intended congressional inertia to weigh against treaty-breaking as well. While the answer
is not obvious from the constitutional text, it is precisely the sort of question the judiciary ought to
decide. To require that a majority of Congress ask that the judiciary do so is to involve the judiciary only in those rare situations when a majority are willing to go on record opposing the President's action. Whenever the majority supports the presidential action, even if the action flagrantly
violates the Constitution, the Goldwater principle prevents a member of Congress from seeking
judicial relief.
34. The relevant majority will depend on the nature of the action and the constitutionally
mandated role. For example, both the House and Senate share the power to declare war. U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl.11. Only the Senate, however, ratifies treaties and consents to appointments.
U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
35. In contrast with this view, Professor Blumoff has endorsed the ripeness approach as
appropriately limiting judicial intervention, at least in the context of foreign affairs. See Theodore
Y. Blumoff, Judicial Review, Foreign Affairs and Legislative Standing, 25 GA. L. REv. 227
(1991); see also infra note 181 (discussing the problems with the ripeness doctrine and Professor
Blumoff's argument).
36. Such costs may include reprinting the legislation, extra physical plant expenses, and
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Many, if not most, congressional lawsuits are aimed at ensuring
that our government remains a government of three branches in the
face of the rise of executive power, which was so feared by the Framers.3 7 In many such cases, "what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system."38 If the courts continue to reject
the efforts of congressional members to maintain the balance of powers
by refusing to take the opportunity to "say what the law is," 39 we will
all be the losers.
Parts II and III review the development of doctrines concerning
congressional plaintiffs, focusing on the subject matter of the cases and
the concerns of the courts. Some of the reasons for the recent emergence and proliferation of lawsuits brought by members of Congress
and the problems with the approaches the courts have used to limit
such suits are discussed briefly. Part IV demonstrates that a proper
understanding of the judiciary's function in a democratic society supports allowing congressional plaintiffs access to courts in certain cases.
Part V, articulates a principled position by which courts may delimit
those cases in which adjudication is appropriate, and then illustrates
how that approach may be implemented in specific areas.

II. THE RISE OF CONGRESSIONAL STANDING
As former Judge Bork noted in his lengthy dissent in Barnes v.
Kline, "[t]he phenomenon of litigation directly between Congress and
the President concerning their respective constitutional powers and prerogatives is a recent one." 40 The first such litigation was brought in
1972 by Congressman Mike Gravel to challenge President Nixon's pursuit of the undeclared war in Indochina.4 1 Others soon followed. Some
additional franking to inform constituents about the repeat process.
37. This rise is most evident in the foreign affairs arena. See, e.g., Harold Koh, Why the
President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-ContraAffair, 97 YALE
L.J. 1255, 1258-75 (1988). It is, nevertheless, evident in other areas as well. See W. Lawrence
Church, History and the ConstitutionalRole of Courts, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1071.
38. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
39. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
40. Barnes v. Kline, 789 F.2d 21, 41 (D.C. Cir.) (Bork, J.,dissenting), vacated as moot sub
nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987). The pivotal word in his carefully worded sentence is
"directly," because there has always been considerable litigation respecting the constitutional allocation of powers between the branches in which the branches espoused opposing positions.
41. Gravel v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1972).
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cases similarly addressed the Vietnam War while others arose
from a
42
actions.
congressional)
occasionally
(and
executive
of
variety
A number of factors contributed to the sudden emergence of such
suits. The 1960s and 70s, an era of civil rights struggle in the streets
and in the courts, saw the rise of law reform litigation as a means to
protect individual rights, and along with it came the liberalization of
the doctrines of standing. Congressional lawsuits seemed a logical
means to "reform" the law concerning the separation of powers, which
several scholars and numerous plaintiffs believed to be an unconstitutional arrogation of power by the executive.43 Courts willing to enlarge
traditional doctrine by granting standing to groups claiming only a generalized interest in protecting the environment 44 might well be more
inclined to hear the complaints of members of Congress charging executive overreaching.
But such suits would probably never have been brought in the heyday of strong party leaders such as House Speaker Sam Rayburn and
Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson. A suggestion of disapproval
from either, and any member contemplating suit would probably have
abandoned the notion.45 Beginning in the 1960s, the dominance of
party leaders like Sam Rayburn and Lyndon Johnson began to disintegrate under pressure from below to "open up" the party system.
Rules changes, particularly within the Democratic Party, diminished
the leaders' power. At the same time, new members of Congress, often
elected without party aid (even over party opposition), demonstrated a
willingness to resist party authority. Disagreement within the parties
42. See, e.g., Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1975); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); Mitchell v. Laird, 488
F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 854 (D. Mass. 1973).
43. See infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
45. See generally ROBERT L. PEABODY, LEADERSHIP IN CONGRESS: HABILITY, SUCCESSION
AND CHANGE (1976); Robert L. Peabody, Senate PartyLeadership; From the 1950s to the 1980s,
and Charles 0. Jones, House Leadership in an Age of Reform, in UNDERSTANDING CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP (Frank H. Mackaman ed., 1981); BARBARA SINCLAIR. MAJORITY LEADERSHIP IN THE U.S. HOUSE (1983); HENDRICK SMITH, THE POWER GAME: How WASHINGTON
WORKS (1988); Lloyd N. Cutler, Party Government Under the American Constitution, 134 U. PA.
L. REV. 25 (1985).
Presidential control over individual members of Congress has also declined, due in part to the
decline of the "coattail" effect by which presidents have ensured that party members riding on
their "coattails" would win election or reelection, the diminishing importance of presidential support in elections, and the decline of party importance and strength in general. These factors might
explain the occasional lawsuit by members of Congress against a president of the same party.
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was strong over the war, over the federal role in civil rights, and over
the enormous changes occurring in lifestyles and norms throughout the
country.48 Maverick members, noting the potential strength in the law
reform arsenal, used it to attempt to halt perceived executive overreaching, particularly when their colleagues and leaders failed to react,
either because of lethargy or acquiescence in executive acts.
Finally, with Richard Nixon's election, Congress as a whole and
the President were of opposing political parties for the first time since
Eisenhower left office in 1961. Reliance upon internal party politics to
contain presidential ambition or interbranch disputes was thus no
longer a possibility, and litigation became the last resort. Indeed, in
recognition of the importance of legal action to congressional politics,
both houses recently established permanent legal offices responsible for
intervening in important litigation on behalf of each house.
Congressional plaintiffs have been largely unsuccessful in their efforts to enlist the courts' aid.4 The courts have reached the merits in
only eight of the more than forty lawsuits in which members of Congress were plaintiffs. In three of those eight cases the courts did not
address the plaintiffs' congressional status.4 In all but two of the re46. See generally sources cited supra note 45.
47. Whether their actions were successful in political terms is, of course, another question.
It is notable that President Bush sought congressional approval only weeks after the court ruled in
Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990), that, if ripe, the court would decide on
whether congressional action was required before initiation of hostilities in the Persian Gulf. See
Ely, supra note 15, at 6; John Omicinski, History of War Powers: It's Always a Fight, Gannett
News Service, Jan. 17, 1992, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File; David G. Savage &
Michael Ross, U.S. Judge Refuses to Block Bush from Starting a War, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14,
1990, at A22.
48. The courts reached the merits in American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Pierce, 697
F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Pressler v. Simon, 428 F. Supp. 302
(D.D.C. 1976); vacated on other grounds sub nom. Pressler v. Blumenthal, 431 U.S. 169 (1977),
and afld by subsequent order, 434 U.S. 1028 (1978); Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C.
1973); Williams v. Phillips, 360 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C. 1973). Courts addressed the merits but
did not address the plaintiff's congressional status in three cases. See Environmental Protection
Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), superseded by statute as stated in NLRB v. Robbins Tire
& Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 226 (1978); Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
McKinney v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 614 F. Supp. 1226 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985),
affid, 799 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1986). In addition, courts addressed the merits in an additional
two cases brought by state legislators. Dennis v. Luis, 714 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1984); Idaho v.
Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107 (D. Idaho 1981), vacated sub nom. National Org. for Women, Inc.
v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982).
The exact number of congressional suits varies depending on how one counts. Members of
Congress sued in their official capacities on more than 40 occasions, but the courts in the three
decisions noted above did not address the issue of status as members of Congress. (This figure
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maining cases the courts found the plaintiffs' congressional status to be
an obstacle to granting relief."
A.

The Early Legislator Standing Cases

Initially, the plaintiffs' special status as members of Congress was
treated, if at all, primarily under the rubric of standing.50 Evolution in
standing analysis made the complex task of delineating the parameters
of cognizable injury in congressional cases more difficult. Most courts
handled concerns about that status by focusing on whether members of
Congress could properly be described as having suffered injury-in-fact

in the particular situation at issue. In doing so, they were following the
lead taken in 1939 in Coleman v. Miller,51 the Supreme Court's only
ruling directly addressing the status of legislative plaintiffs.
In Coleman, five justices, three in the plurality and two in dissent,
found that twenty Kansas legislators, whose votes would have been sufficient to block Kansas' ratification of a federal constitutional amendment, had standing to challenge the legality of the governor's tie-breakexcludes Powell v. McCormick, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), in which Adam Clayton Powell sued concerning his personal status as a member of the House of Representatives.) In a fourth case, members of Congress intervened in one lawsuit when the executive defendant challenged the constitutionality of certain legislation. See Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d
875 (3d Cir. 1986).
The courts have denied standing to state legislators suing in their official capacities in at least
two instances. See Korioth v. Briscoe, 523 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1975); Wilt v. Beal, 363 A.2d 876
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976).
49. Several courts have barred claims on political question grounds. See supra note 6. Of
those courts relying on political question grounds, three courts dismissed the claims because the
plaintiffs were members of Congress. See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987); Gravel v. Laird,
347 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1972); see also Korioth v. Briscoe, 523 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1975) (denying standing to state legislators who sued in their official capacities); Wilt v. Beal, 363 A.2d 876
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976) (same). One concurring opinion in another decision noted that the plaintiffs were members of Congress while stating that the court should dismiss the claim because it
was not ripe. See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring). The court in Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990), dismissed on similar ripeness grounds. Only in one decision was the plaintiffs' status found to present no impediment to adjudication. See Mitchell v. Laird, 422 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
50. See, e.g., Recess v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978);
Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Metcalf v. National Petroleum Council, 553
F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1975); Kennedy v.
Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Holzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); Public Citizen v. Sampson, 379 F. Supp. 662 (D.D.C. 1974),
affd without op., 515 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Brown v. Ruckelhaus, 364 F. Supp. 258 (C.D.
Cal. 1973).
51. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
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ing favorable vote. The Court held that the tie-breaking vote had
effectively nullified the senators' votes and hence would, if illegal, constitute cognizable injury. "We think that these senators have a plain,
direct, and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their
votes" wrote the Court. 2 Injury to that interest supported standing.
Four Justices, per Justice Frankfurter, concurring, strongly disagreed, contending that Supreme Court jurisdiction was limited to
matters that "to the expert feel of lawyers constitute[d] 'Cases' or
'Controversies.'" Justice Frankfurter insisted that Coleman was
neither. "Cases" and "Controversies" encompassed only those demonstrating "the requisites of litigation" appropriate to the "litigious process," "actual controversies" and "litigious business." To be entitled to
judicial assistance, plaintiffs had to demonstrate a "specialized interest
of their own" or a "special, individualized stake" in the litigation.
Frankfurter maintained that the Coleman legislators were, by contrast,
"merely self-constituted spokesm[en]," raising "political concern[s]
which belong to us all." 53 Their claims, he urged, were "public controversies clothed in the form of private litigation," and not the private
sort of harm "appropriate for disposition by judges." 54 Frankfurter explained that such public controversies were inappropriate for judicial
resolution because the Framers had not intended courts "to meddle
with matters that require no subtlety to be identified as political issues." 5 He suggested that "doctrines of judicial self-limitation" de52. Id. at 438. The Court did not indicate that it conferred standing because all 20 dissenting senators joined the suit. Although the appellants in Kennedy v. Sampson argued the significance of this fact, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit rejected it as a controlling principle.
See Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 434-35 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
53. Justice Frankfurter struggled mightily with the problem of distinguishing politics from
law that has plagued many scholars. Much of his effort was tautological, and reminiscent of Justice Stewart's famous assertion about pornography: "I know it when I see it." See Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964). For Frankfurter, cases and controversies are recognizable as such
by lawyers' "expert feel" because they, are "litigious" in nature and "appropriate for disposition
by judges." Coleman, 307 U.S. at 460 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
As several critical legal scholars have argued, this hollow analysis is inevitable because the
formal distinction between law and politics lacks substance. See generally CRITICAL LEGAL STUDiEs 4 (Alan C. Hutchinson ed., 1989) ("The main target of [critical legal studies] has been the
crucial distinction between law and politics...."); THE POLITICS OF LAW (David Kairys ed., rev.
ed., 1990).
54. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 461 (Frankfurter, J.,concurring). Justice Frankfurter echoes
James Madison who interpreted the "case and controversy" language to limit jurisdiction to
"cases of a Judiciary Nature." See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
430 (M. Farrand ed., 1966). Whether Madison's intended limits parallel those of Frankfurter
remains debatable. See also Blumoff, supra note 35, at 252-53.
55. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 460 (Frankfuter, J.,concurring).
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rived from proper "conceptions regarding the distribution of governmental powers" underlay the Framers' choice to limit jurisdiction to
"Cases" and "Controversies." In a precursor to Judge Bork's expanded
rendition, Justice Frankfurter pictured the majority's holding as sending the Court down a slippery slope toward intrusive and inappropriate
review of a wide variety of internal legislative rules and procedures.56
No such slide occurred. Not until the 1970s was federal jurisdiction again invoked by legislative plaintiffs. Moreover, congressional
plaintiffs have sought review of the legislature's internal rules or procedures in only one case.57 Rather, congressional lawsuits have sought
court review of the President's authority to violate constitutional provisions and to administer various statutes in a given manner. 58 Some suits
also challenge the constitutionality of legislation delegating to the President powers allegedly accorded to Congress.

The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Mitchell v. Laird °
was the first to address directly the effect of congressional status upon

plaintiffs' standing to sue. In Mitchell, thirteen representatives claimed
that the Nixon administration's prosecution of the Vietnam War lacked

proper constitutional authorization. The plaintiffs asserted injury to
their "Constitutional right, as members of the Congress of the United
States, to decide whether the United States should fight a war."'" The

court rejected this injury as insufficient to support standing on the
questionable ground that Congress' right to declare war was not "ex-

clusive."

2

The court nonetheless conferred standing on its own sug-

56. Id. at 469-70 (Frankfuter, J., concurring). The Court's refusal on political question
grounds to rule on the legality of the tie-breaking ratification vote had the same result as denying
standing.
57. Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
58. See supra notes 6, 9.
59. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Humphrey v. Brady, 488 U.S. 966 (1988); Pressler v. Simon, 428 F. Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1976),
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Pressler v. Blumenthal, 431 U.S. 169 (1977), affid by subsequent order, 434 U.S. 1028 (1978).
60. 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
61. Id. at 614.
62. See id. at 613-14. The court suggested that somehow because the President may have
the right to "take the initiative" in responding to "a belligerent attack, or [in a] grave emergency," plaintiffs were not harmed by prosecution of the war without a declaration. Id.
It is unclear why the court believed that injury to a non-exclusive right to declare war failed
to confer standing. In evaluating a motion to dismiss for want of standing, the courts ordinarily
interpret the plaintiffs' allegations as true. See Worth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). Presumably the plaintiffs in Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974), claimed that even
if not "exclusively" empowered to decide whether to go to war, their declaration was constitutionally required.
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gested bases. The court found that because the defendants' actions, if

illegal, would "bear upon the duties of plaintiffs to consider whether to
impeach defendants, and upon plaintiffs' quite distinct and different
duties to make appropriations to support the hostilities, or to take other
legislative actions related to such hostilities," plaintiffs had standing to
sue.63 Apart from this reference to plaintiffs' special duties as members
of Congress, the court did not discuss the implications of plaintiffs' staof powers contus as such. No reference was made to the separation
64
cerns raised by Frankfurter's Coleman concurrence.
The Mitchell court's generous standing approach was never followed, and it was later repudiated by the circuit. 65 Instead, most courts

followed the Second Circuit's lead in Holtzman v. Schlesinger.66 In
that case, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied Representative Holtzman standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief to
halt the undeclared Vietnam War.67 The court of appeals also dismissed Holtzman's claim as a non-justiciable political question but suggested in dicta that congressional plaintiffs suffer injury only if executive action impairs their abilities to participate fully in congressional
activities and votes. The test was not whether Holtzman's effectiveness

was impaired, but whether her alleged ineffectiveness was due to denial
63. Mitchell, 488 F.2d at 614.
64. The court found the issue regarding the legality of the war to be a political question. Id.
at 614-16. That the court did not address the separation of powers concerns is not surprising,
because the Supreme Court had already indicated in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968) that
"[tihe question [as to] whether a particular person is a proper party to maintain the action does
and such concerns were hence no
not, by its own force, raise separation of powers problems ....
part of the standing inquiry. As argued infra, the Court may have been correct in failing to find
special separation of powers concerns. See discussion infra part IV.B.
65. One D.C. district court did find standing, citing the Mitchell standard. Williams v. Phillips, 360 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C.), stay denied, 482 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The Williams
standing decision was never reviewed by a higher court, and no court of appeals has ever adopted
or followed the Mitchell standard. See, e.g., Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(rejecting Mitchell explicitly and noting the failure of any court of appeals to follow Mitchell's
holding).
66. 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
67. Id. at 1315. The district court had denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding
that Holtzman had standing and the matter was not a political question, and declaring the Vietnam War illegal and enjoining its prosecution. The court stayed its own judgment pending appeal,
setting off a round of appeals to the Supreme Court to vacate the stay. See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304 (Marshall, Circuit Justice 1973) (denying application to vacate the court of
appeals' order that stayed the district court injunction); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1316
(Douglas, Circuit Justice 1973) (granting second application to vacate the stay); Schlesinger v.
Holtzman, 414 U.S. 1321 (Marshall, Circuit Justice 1973) (ordering stay of district court
injunction).
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by the executive of her ability to participate fully in the congressional
process. Not only was Holtzman a full participant in the congressional
process, noted the Court, but "[t]he fact that her vote was ineffective
was due to the contrary votes of her colleagues and not the defendants
herein." 8
B. Kennedy v. Sampson and the Current Congressional Standing
Test
Kennedy v. Sampson,"' the first appellate case to find standing,
reach the merits, and hold for the plaintiff, involved precisely the type
of injury to members' ability to participate in constitutional processes
that Holtzman suggested might support standing. Senator Kennedy
challenged, as an unconstitutional nullification of his vote, President
Nixon's 1970 attempt to "pocket veto" the Family Practice of
Medicine Act (the "Act"), which had been passed by overwhelming
majorities in both Houses.7 0 Kennedy sought a declaration that the Act
71
had become law and an injunction requiring its publication as such.
The panel unanimously affirmed the district court's finding that Kennedy had standing as "an individual United States Senator who voted
in favor of [the Act] .' 72 Analyzing standing along two different lines
suggested by Supreme Court decisions, the court found both a "logical
nexus"7 3 between the claimant (Kennedy) and the claim (nullification
of his previously cast vote and denial of his right to vote to override a
veto), and that Senator Kennedy had suffered injury-in-fact, and was
68. Holtzman, 484 F.2d at 1315. Apparently the court neither considered whether the contrary votes of her colleagues had denied Holtzman a constitutionally mandated opportunity to vote
not to declare war, nor whether such a denial by her colleagues might appropriately support
standing to challenge the executive's actions pursuant to an allegedly improper process.
69. 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

70. Congress passed the Act just before it adjourned for an intrasession recess. The Senate
appointed an official to receive vetoed bills while Congress was in temporary recess, but the President nonetheless refused to return the Act to Congress for possible override. Instead, he issued a
statement of disapproval announcing his refusal to sign the Act. Id. at 432.

The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929), upheld the President's power to veto a bill by
failing to return it to Congress when Congress was in recess as provided in Article I of the U.S.
Constitution. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cI. 2.
71.

Since the Act itself would have expired by the time of the Court's decision, its publica-

tion would have had limited effect. The concurring opinion in Kennedy, however, said the issue
was still not moot. Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 446 (Fahy, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 433.
73. Id. (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968)).
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within the "zone of interests" 7 4 protected by the constitutional guarantees regarding vetoes and overrides. 5
To defendants' assertion that the constitutional provisions in question protect only the interests of Congress itself or one of its houses, the
court responded that "in light of the purpose of the standing requirement . . . the better reasoned view . . . is that an individual legislator
has standing to protect the effectiveness of his vote with or without the
concurrence of other members of the majority. 7 Noting that the primary concern of standing doctrine is that litigants have sufficient personal stake to ensure that the matter is litigated with the necessary
concreteness and specificity, the court found Kennedy to be a proper
litigant. According to standing doctrine, the Court said, a litigant need
only be "among the injured," not the "most grievously or most directly
injured."" The fact that Senator Kennedy's injury was in a sense "derivative" of the injury to Congress' as a whole did not negate the fact
that nullification of his individual vote was a "nonetheless substantial"
injury.7 8 Kennedy thus established that individual members of Congress
denied a constitutionally mandated voting opportunity, or denied participation in a constitutionally specified process, are proper plaintiffs.7
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and other courts that
have addressed congressional standing have followed the test articulated in Kennedy, albeit with varied and sometimes confused explanations of the rule.80 In the 1970s, the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit sometimes also seemed to condition standing on whether congressional claimants' colleagues approved or disapproved of the
claims.8 1 In decisions during the 1980s, however, the court suggested a
74. These two requirements were derived from Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970), and were said to apply to parties who
challenge administrative action.
75. See US. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
76. Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
77. Id. The court cited Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) and Flast, 392 U.S. at 106
and Camp, 397 U.S. at 152-53 for its basic propositions concerning standing.
78. Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 436.
79. Id. at 433, 436. According to the Kennedy court, Coleman did not dictate otherwise
because the Coleman Court had not relied on the fact that plaintiffs included all 20 legislators
who voted against ratification and who, but for the allegedly illegally cast tie-breaking vote, would
have prevailed. Id. at 435.
80. See, e.g., Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823
(1983); Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 877-79 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1082 (1981).
81. See, e.g., Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 202-03 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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broader, more liberal view of congressional standing." Generally, when
members of Congress as plaintiffs have alleged that the executive deprived them of a constitutionally mandated opportunity to vote, standing to sue has been upheld. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
reaffirmed the Kennedy doctrine in another pocket veto case, Barnes v.
84
Kline,88 decided several years later.
Similarly, in Moore v. United States House of Representatives,85
eighteen members of Congress were found to have standing to challenge a revenue bill when they alleged a nullification of their right to
have revenue bills originate in the House and not the Senate."6 "Deprivation of a constitutionally mandated process of enacting law," inflicted
a specific injury on a member of Congress sufficient to support
7
standing.
In another decision, a three-judge panel conferred standing upon
Representative Pressler when he challenged a newly enacted method of
setting salaries for federal officers, including members of Congress, as
unconstitutional.8 8 The court held that "where... a member of Con82. See, e.g., Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 823 (1983); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(per curiam).
83. 759 F.2d 21, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S.
361 (1987).
84. Similarly the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit surveyed its prior decisions and
drew a distinction between:
(1) a diminution in congressional influence resulting from an Executive action that nullifies
a specific congressional vote or opportunity to vote, in an objectively verifiable manner-which, we have found, constitutes injury in fact; and (2) a diminution in a legislator's
effectiveness, subjectively judged by him or her, resulting from Executive action withholding information or failing to obey a statute ... in which situations we do not find injury in
fact. To be cognizable for standing purposes, the alleged diminution in congressional influence must amount to a disenfranchisement, a complete nullification or withdrawal of a
voting opportunity; and the plaintiff must point to an objective standard in the Constitution, statutes or congressional house rules, by which disenfranchisement can be shown.
Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (footnotes omitted).
85. 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
86. Id. at 951-52; see also Humphrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (granting
standing to congressional plaintiffs, but dismissing on equitable discretion grounds); Melcher v.
Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (same); Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d
539 (1985) (same).
87. Moore, 733 F.2d at 951.
88. Pressler v. Simon, 428 F. Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated on other grounds sub nom.
Pressler v. Blumenthal, 431 U.S. 169 (1977), and affd by subsequent order, 434 U.S. 1028
(1978). The district court dismissed Pressler's claim on the merits. Id. at 306. The district court in
Pressler was ultimately affirmed by the Supreme Court. Justice Rehnquist wrote, however, that
the "affirmance does not reflect this Court's agreement with the conclusion reached by the district
court on the merits," but rather, "could rest as readily on our conclusion that the appellant lacked
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gress alleges he is prevented from voting to perform a specific legislative duty expressly mandated by the Constitution, the suit may be cognizable by the courts so long as there is no attempt being made to
interfere with the internal workings of the Congress itself." 89 The panel
distinguished Representative Pressler's claim from one merely brought
by a legislator unhappy with the outcome of a vote. 90
Finally, in Dellums v. Bush,9" the district court applied the circuit's standing test to grant standing to congressional plaintiffs who
challenged President Bush's threatened initiation of war in the Persian
Gulf without first obtaining congressional authorization. The Dellums
plaintiffs' claim of impingement on their constitutionally ordained obligation to declare war perfectly fit the paradigm of congressional standing established by the court of appeals. The President was threatening
injury to the plaintiffs by denying them the opportunity to vote in a
situation in which the Constitution explicitly requires their approval.
Other circuits have followed the D.C. Circuit's approach to congressional standing. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit applied
the D.C. Circuit's standing test to a suit brought by eight members of
the Virgin Islands legislature challenging a governor's appointment of
an acting commissioner of commerce."2 The court found that the nullification of the legislators' statutory right to advise and consent to executive appointments provided a uniquely personal and legally cognizable
injury. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently recognized that "under the modern test for standing a legislator's loss of
effectiveness in voting constitutes injury in fact."9 4 The court denied
standing, however, on the ground that plaintiff Senator Chiles had only
a "subjective belief" that his effectiveness was diminished.9 5 The court
contrasted Chiles' claim with a congressional assertion that required
procedures had not been followed. In such a case, the legislator's loss
standing to litigate." See Pressler v. Blumenthal, 434 U.S. 1028, 1028-29 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
89. Pressler,428 F. Supp. at 304.
90. See id.
91. 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1147 (D.D.C. 1990).
92. Dennis v. Luis, 741 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1984).

93. Id.
94.

Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1205-06 (11th Cir. 1989).

95.

Id. Senator Chiles argued that the Attorney General's failure to carryout pre-enactment

promises diminished the effectiveness of his vote. Id. at 1206.
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can be "objectively measured" and hence she may have suffered a legally cognizable injury. 98
Although at times their rationales were unclear, courts have denied standing in numerous other cases in which congressional plaintiffs
failed to assert deprivation of a constitutionally mandated procedure or
opportunity to vote. 97 But for the most part when this type of deprivation has occurred, courts have granted standing to congressional plaintiffs. A grant of standing, however, has not usually resulted in a ruling
on the merits. Rather, other doctrines have been invoked which allow
courts to avoid adjudicating congressional claims.
III. THE RISE OF EQUITABLE DISCRETION AND RIPENESS AS BARS
TO CONGRESSIONAL LAWSUITS

The 1980s saw an abrupt shift of emphasis in courts' analysis regarding whether congressional plaintiffs could obtain judicial relief.
Rather than utilizing standing doctrine as a gatekeeper, the courts
turned instead to prudential considerations framed in terms of "equitable discretion" or of "ripeness." The result has been, at best, confusion
and muddle; it has been, at worst, a tacit reworking of the Constitution
itself.
By the end of the 1970s, courts had analyzed the jurisdictional
impact of plaintiffs' congressional status in some seventeen cases and
had reached the merits in only a handful. Declining jurisdiction in most
cases, courts raised the specter of "roving commissions" of members of
Congress; "small groups" or "even individual[s]" seeking out the courts
to continue their political battles, which would "inevitably" lead to unwarranted court intrusion into the "proper affairs of the coequal
branches of government." 9 8 Standing was frequently invoked to prevent
such intrusion. Yet standing doctrine, whose parameters had been developed in relation to lawsuits brought by private parties, often seemed
ill-suited to address concerns related to congressional status. Indeed, in
the early 1980s, the courts turned elsewhere.
A.

Equitable or Remedial Discretion
In an influential article, D.C. Circuit Judge McGowan charted a

96. Id. at 1206.
97. United Presbyterian Church v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (refusing
to confer standing to challenge an executive order because the representative was not denied the
right to vote).
98. See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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new course, arguing that the doctrines of standing, political question,
and ripeness "fail in varying degrees to account for the underlying separation of powers concerns" raised when members of Congress sue the
executive branch.9 9 Instead, he urged, courts should use their "traditional discretion to grant or withhold equitable relief" as a tool to address those separation of powers concerns.100
McGowan demonstrated that D.C. Circuit decisions in the 1970s
had been imposing more stringent standing requirements on congressional claimants than on "ordinary" plaintiffs, contrary to the circuit's
own purported principle that "there are no special standards for determining congressional standing." 10 1 The notion that congressional plaintiffs were not injured if they could obtain redress from their colleagues
was misguided, Judge McGowan argued, because private plaintiffs
were not required to exhaust other avenues of relief in order to demonstrate injury. Rather than imposing this unwarranted constitutional
burden and creating unnecessary doctrinal confusion, courts should
grant standing whenever the traditional tests were met 102 but use their
equitable discretion to deny relief if it appeared that they were being
asked to intervene in the activities of coordinate branches before the
political process had played itself out.103 Courts ought to deny a remedy to legislative plaintiffs whose "dispute is really with fellow legislators" and "who could get substantial relief from [them]."104 But such

prudential considerations were better addressed, he argued, through
case-by-case analysis than by establishing special rules for congressional standing that might altogether foreclose courts from taking cases
by importing separation of powers concerns into standing analysis.
99.

McGowan, supra note 10, at 244.

100. Id.
101. Id. at 254 (quoting Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (emphasis
omitted)).
102. "[The maximum burden which a plaintiff must bear to attain standing [is]: establishment of (i) injury-in-fact (ii) to an interest protected by the relevant law (iii) where the injury is
caused by defendants' actions or capable of judicial redress." -Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt.

Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 878 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
103. Judge McGowan's approach was first adopted in Riegle as "circumscribed equitable
discretion" to indicate that there were special circumstances in congressional plaintiff cases that

warranted denial of jurisdiction for prudential reasons even when plaintiffs should be granted
standing. Id. at 881; see also McGowan, supra note 10, at 265. The word "circumscribed" was
later dropped by most courts, and the term "remedial discretion" came to be applied when plain-

tiffs sought not merely declaratory, but also injunctive relief. See, e.g., United Presbyterian
Church v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1381 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Vander Jagt v. O'Neil, 699 F.2d
1166, 1175 n.25 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
104. McGowan, supra note 10, at 263.
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A few months later, the D.C. Circuit adopted his view. 0 5 When
Michigan Senator Riegle asserted that the appointment of certain
members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) violated his
Article I right to confirm the appointment of federal officers, the Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit granted Riegle standing, 0 8 despite its
ruling three years earlier which denied standing in an almost identical
case brought by Congressman Reuss. 07 The court in Riegle held that
the senator's alleged "inability to exercise his right under the Appointments Clause of the Constitution is an injury sufficiently personal to
constitute an injury-in-fact."' 0 8
The court nonetheless dismissed Riegle's claim, using its newly applied "equitable discretion" to address separation of powers concerns. 0 9 The court found that "there can be no doubt that Senator
Riegle's congressional colleagues are capable of affording him substantial relief" by amending the legislation setting up the FOMC. 10 Noting that "the war over public versus private control of the Committee
. . . has been waged in the legislative arena since 1933" and that a bill
to require Senate approval of the "private" members had recently been
introduced, the court held that "[i]t would be unwise to permit the
federal courts to become a higher legislature where a congressman who
has failed to persuade his colleagues can always renew the battle.""'
The court thus sought to separate standing and separation of powers concerns."12 The new doctrine would, according to the court, serve
105. Riegle, 656 F.2d at 880-81. Senator Riegle, like Congressman Reuss before him, was
challenging appointments to the Federal Open Market Committee, which plays an important role
in the Federal Reserve System, made by private banks without congressional approval. Id. at 877.
106. Id. at 882.
107. See Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
108. Riegle, 656 F.2d at 878.
109. Id. at 881-82.
110. Id. at 881.
111. Id. at 882. The court added, "Where a congressional plaintiff could obtain substantial
relief from his fellow legislators through the enactment, repeal or amendment of a statute, this
Court should exercise its equitable discretion to dismiss the legislator's action." Id. at 881.
112. Id. at 882. The Riegle court also suggested that whether a similar action could be
brought by a private plaintiff would be an important factor in whether the court should exercise
its equitable discretion. The court said it "would welcome congressional plaintiff actions involving
non-frivolous claims of unconstitutional action which, because they could not be brought by a
private plaintiff and are not subject to legislative redress, would go unreviewed unless brought by
a legislative plaintiff." Id. Later courts rejected the notion that they should entertain congressional
suits merely because a matter might otherwise go unreviewed. See, e.g., Melcher v. Federal Open
Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561, 564-65 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court in
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454
U.S. 464 (1982), expressly rejected that notion), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988).
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as a more precise articulation of the underlying separation of powers
concerns. It would not permit congressional plaintiffs to "circumvent
the processes of democratic decisionmaking," 1 13 yet would assure that

"nonfrivolous claims of unconstitutional action which could only be
brought by members of Congress will be reviewed on the merits.""1 4
The equitable discretion doctrine has not fulfilled this promise.
Rather, it has almost invariably resulted in dismissal of congressional
lawsuits, even "nonfrivolous" ones. Throughout the 1980s, the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit dismissed congressional challenges to several allegedly unconstitutional executive, and occasionally congressional, acts while always citing equitable or remedial discretion. The
courts dismissed on equitable grounds challenges to the Reagan Administration's provision of aid to El Salvador in alleged violation of the
human rights provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act;" 5 the 1987

U.S. escort operations for reflagged Kuwait tankers in the Persian Gulf
in alleged violation of the War Powers Resolution; 1 ' the House of
113. Riegle, 656 F.2d at 881.
114. Id.
115. Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 902 (D.D.C. 1982), affd per curiam, 720 F.2d
1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984). In Crockett, 29 representatives challenged the United States' military actions in El Salvador as violative of the Constitution's War
Powers Clause, the War Powers Resolution, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Id. at 895.
The district court found that the war powers issues presented non-justiciable political questions
because of the difficulty of finding whether hostilities in El Salvador were imminent. Id. at 896-98.
Noting the parties' starkly different versions of the nature of United States' activities in El Salvador, the court held that it "lack[ed] the resources and expertise (which are accessible to the Congress) to resolve disputed questions of fact concerning the military situation in El Salvador." Id. at
898.
The court erred in finding that difficult fact-finding renders a question "political." Courts are
expert at choosing among different versions to decide facts. Moreover, courts often decide whether
activities such as those in El Salvador constitute hostilities in civil actions claiming benefits accorded during wartime. See, e.g., York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260, 264 (10th Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 811 (1947); Jackson v. North Am. Assurance Soc'y, 183 S.E.2d
160, 160-61 (Va. 1971). Moreover, as the Iran-Contra hearings demonstrated, the "resources and
expertise" accessible to Congress are no more likely to resolve disputed questions of fact than is a
court. See generally Koh, supra note 37, at 1275-79.
The court found it unnecessary to address whether the war powers claims should also be
dismissed on equitable discretion grounds. Crockett, 558 F. Supp. at 901. The court, however, did
dismiss on equitable discretion grounds plaintiffs' claim that providing security assistance to El
Salvador violated the Foreign Assistance Act because that country failed to make progress on
human rights. "[P]laintiffs' dispute," the court said, "is primarily with their fellow legislators who
have authorized aid to El Salvador while specifically addressing the human rights issue, and who
have accepted the President's certifications." Id. at 902.
116. Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987). In Lowry, 110 representatives,
who claimed that the reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution had been triggered by
the 1987 U.S. escort operations for reflagged Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf and by the
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Representatives' allegedly discriminatory allocation of committee assignments; 117 the invasion of Grenada in purported violation of the War
Powers Clause of the Constitution; 118 a tax statute that originated in
the Senate rather than House;1 19 the failure to maintain the accuracy
of the congressional record,120 the constitutionality of the Federal Salary Act; 2 ' the Boland Amendment's constraints on executive support
September 21, 1987 attack on an Iranian Navy ship laying mines in the Gulf, sought an order
requiring the President to submit the report. Id. at 334. The court declined to hear the case, citing
"prudential considerations" and the political question doctrine. The court found that "[a]lthough
styled as a dispute between the legislative and executive branches," the suit was really "a byproduct of political disputes within Congress regarding the applicability of the War Powers Resolution." Id. at 338. Pointing to the numerous bills that were introduced to repeal or strengthen the
War Powers Resolution and to a statement by one plaintiff that he joined the suit to resolve a
question "Congress seemed unwilling to decide," the court concluded that the dispute was intrabranch and refused to "render a decision that.., would impose a consensus on Congress." Id. at
338-39. Three senators who were plaintiffs withdrew from the lawsuit. Id. at 334 n.l.
117. Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823
(1983). In Vander Jagt, the court found that 14 Republican representatives had standing to challenge the House Democratic leadership's allegedly discriminatory allocation of committee assignments. Id. at 1168-77. The court, nevertheless, denied relief. Id. It held that it would be unwise to
interfere with the House's method of allocating committee assignments not because it lacked
power to act, nor because "a remedy could not be fashioned," but because it would be a "'startlingly unattractive' idea" for the court to tell the House speaker how to handle such matters. Id.
at 1176 (quoting Davids v. Akers, 549 F.2d 120, 123 (9th Cir. 1977)).
118. Conyers v. Reagan, 578 F. Supp. 324 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal dismissed as moot, 765
F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In Conyers, the court was confronted with a challenge by 11 representatives, who argued that the Grenada invasion violated the Constitution's War Powers Clause.
Id. at 325; see also U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (War Powers Clause). Plaintiffs sought a
declaration of illegality and an injunction directing the removal of U.S. forces from Grenada.
Conyers, 578 F. Supp. at 326. The court declined to rule "based on the doctrine of circumscribed
equitable/remedial discretion," and asserted that the plaintiffs possessed "the institutional remedies available to Congress as a body; specifically, the War Powers Resolution ... appropriations
legislation or even impeachment." Id. at 327 (citations omitted). If the plaintiffs were unable to
persuade the requisite number of legislators to employ these "remedies," "it would be unwise for
this Court to scrutinize that determination .... " Id. at 327. By the time the matter reached the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, it was dismissed as moot because the invasion had ended.
See Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
119. Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985).
120. Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
121. Humphrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 966 (1988).
Senator Humphrey and five representatives challenged the constitutionality of the Federal Salary
Act. The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing but dismissed on the merits. Id. at
213-14. The district court relied upon the disfavored, if not repudiated, dicta in Riegle disapproving dismissal on equitable discretion grounds when no private plaintiff could bring suit. Id. at 213.
The panel, "fully mindful ... that this circuit's recently minted doctrine of equitable discretion
has not even been addressed, much less endorsed, by the Supreme Court", believed itself bound by
circuit precedent to dismiss the suit as one primarily between members of the legislature, for
which "an 'in-house' remedy" was available. Id. at 214.
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of the Nicaraguan contras;12 322 and yet again to allegedly improper appointments to the FOMC.
While the equitable discretion doctrine has been widely applied by
the D.C. Circuit, it has come under increasing attack from inside and
outside the court. Judge Harry Edwards, concurring in Melcher v. Federal Open Market Committee, concluded that "[u]pon reflection, it is
no longer clear to me that equitable discretion is a viable doctrine upon
which to determine the fate of constitutional litigation."12 ' Judges
Starr and Ginsburg, constituting the majority in Melcher, agreed with
Edwards by way of a footnote. 2 5 The unanimous panel in Humphrey v.
Baker1 26 applied the doctrine, yet expressly stated that it shared the
concerns expressed by Edwards. Former Judges Bork and Scalia also
both criticized the doctrine as "rudderless adjudication"1 27 or "ad hoc"
case-by-case determination of whether it is "wise" or "useful" to intervene in a particular dispute.128 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, however, has never openly disavowed the doctrine, 129 in all likelihood because it has proved useful in avoiding adjudication of troubling
congressional claims. The court thus has continued, despite criticisms
of the doctrine, to apply equitable or remedial discretion as its law.
The doctrine has engendered considerable confusion. First, the
Riegle court's suggestion that the availability of private plaintiffs was
relevant in deciding whether to reach the merits in congressional suits
appeared to run afoul of the Supreme Court's holding in Schlesinger v.
Reservists Committee to Stop the War.130 The Court there stated that
"[t]he assumption that if respondents [citizens] have no standing to
sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing." '
That apparent inconsistency was resolved by the court of appeals' later
122.
123.
U.S. 1042
124.

Dornan v. United States Secretary of Defense, 851 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
Melcher v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486
(1988).
Melcher, 836 F.2d at 565 (Edwards, J., concurring).

125. Id. at 565 n.4.
126. 848 F.2d 211, 214 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 966 (1988). The panel consisted
of Judges Wald, Starr and Edwards. Id. at 212.
127. Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1184 (D.C. Cir.) (Bork, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
128. Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Scalia, J.,concurring), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985).
129. Additionally, some commentators have criticized the doctrine. See, e.g., Sophia C.
Goodman, Note, Equitable Discretion to Dismiss Congressional-Plaintiffs'Suits: A Reassessment, 40 CAsE W. REs. L. REV. 1075 (1990).
130. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
131. Id. at 227.
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holding that despite the dicta in Riegle, a senator could not challenge
the FOMC appointment
process, despite the unlikelihood of a success32
ful private challenge.1
Second, it remained unclear whether there remained any standing
barrier to adjudication of congressional lawsuits. Shortly after Riegle,
the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit suggested that it had virtually abandoned the standing inquiry in congressional lawsuits and that,
as long as members of Congress could claim that they were in any way
injured or their political power diluted; the only inquiry would be
whether the court should exercise its remedial discretion to deny relief. 33 But more recent decisions have continued to recognize and follow the distinctions made in Kennedy, Goldwater and Harrington between the denial of an opportunity to vote and the mere diminution in
the effectiveness of a vote by denying standing to representatives who
allege only the latter injury.'
The main problem with the remedial discretion doctrine, however,
lies in the formulation itself. The inquiry as to whether "the congressional plaintiff can obtain substantial relief from his fellow legislators,
through the enactment, repeal or amendment of a statute" actually offers no guideline because any challenge brought by members of Congress can be framed as one as to which Congress itself can grant relief.
For example, the paradigmatic cases of congressional injury are
the pocket veto cases, Kennedy v. Sampson and Barnes v. Kline. In
each case, Congress enacted a statute, the President exploited an imminent congressional recess by failing to sign or return the statute for
possible override, instead declaring it not to be law, and members of
Congress challenged the "pocket veto." In each case, the court of appeals found standing, reached the merits, and upheld the congressional
claim. But in each case, the plaintiffs could have obtained relief from
fellow legislators; Congress could have reenacted the law and forced
the President to veto it through the normal process. 35 Yet plainly the
132. See Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988).
133. See Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1168-69, 1174-75 n.24 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).

134. See, e.g., United Presbyterian Church v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1381-82 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Helms v. Secretary of the Treasury, 721 F. Supp. 1354 (D.D.C. 1989).
135. Presidents use the "pocket veto" because of a claimed ambiguity or loophole in constitutional veto provisions. Were Congress to reenact a statute following its recess however, the President could not refuse to return an unsigned law for possible veto without creating a clear constitutional crisis. For a thorough discussion of the pocket veto, see Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d
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senators had suffered nonfrivolous injury. Even though Senators Ken-

nedy and Barnes could have obtained relief from their fellow legislators, they were injured precisely in having to re-enact the law; their
first vote having been nullified. They would be required to spend time
and energy redoing what had already been done: mustering energy,
votes, and commitments to gain re-enactment. The constitutional pro-

cess specifying a limited time within which the President must sign,
veto, or permit a law would have been rendered meaningless.13 6
Similarly, the dispute in Dellums v. Bush13 7 could have been characterized as one between fellow legislators. There, the district court

properly held that remedial discretion was inapplicable.1 13 While the
claim that the President should be prevented from acting absent a congressional declaration of war plainly asserted a dispute between the
branches, a congressional remedy was possible. Congress could have
enacted a statute denying the President the power and funding to con-

duct offensive military operations in the Persian Gulf."3 9 Although as a
practical matter-given the threat of an executive veto or even execu-

tive defiance-that course was probably foreclosed, relief from fellow
members of Congress was theoretically available. Indeed, two other district courts reached this conclusion in cases involving congressional war
powers challenges to the executive's alleged unlawful use of force
abroad. 4 0 Both of those courts dismissed in their "remedial discretion"
because plaintiffs could theoretically obtain legislative relief. 4 1 Thus,
430, 437-440 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
136. A congressional enactment becomes law if the President has not returned it to Congress within 10 days (exclusive of Sundays) after he receives it, "unless the Congress by their
Adjournment prevent its Return." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. In Barnes and Kennedy, each
house had designated an official to receive returned enactments during the recesses. Barnes v.
Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S.
361 (1987); Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 432. Hence, Congress had not "prevent[ed]" the return of
legislation.
137. 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
138. Id. at 1148-49.
139. Article I of the Constitution grants Congress not only the power of the purse, but the
authority to raise armies (and arguably the power to refuse to raise them). U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8,
cl. 12. Of course, were the President to refuse to obey legislation denying funds or troops to a
particular war effort, the courts may again be faced with the question of whether individual members of Congress could sue or whether they should muster the necessary members to pass further
legislation or to impeach.
140. See Lowrey v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 337-39 (D.D.C. 1987); Conyers v. Reagan,
578 F. Supp. 324, 326-37 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal dismissed as moot, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir.

1985).
141. See Lowrey, 676 F. Supp. at 337-38; Conyers, 578 F. Supp. at 327. The Lowrey court
also invoked a ripeness analysis as part of its equitable discretion. Lowrey, 676 F. Supp. at 340-41.
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application of equitable and remedial discretion to congressional suits
results in decisions and outcomes at least as confused, unpredictable,
and inconsistent as those under the "muddled" standing doctrine it was
designed to replace.
The remedial discretion doctrine's focus on whether an individual
legislator can obtain relief from her colleagues is misplaced. The real
question to be addressed when members of Congress sue is the nature
of their injuries, a traditional standing inquiry. When the executive
takes action either: (1) without first obtaining constitutionally required
congressional approval; or (2) that nullifies a congressional vote already
taken, the individual legislator is injured irrespective of whether Congress could or does take corrective action eventually forcing the executive to comply. This is so because the constitutional injury lies precisely
in Congress and its individual members having to replay the political
process by voting again on the same underlying issue in order to reverse
or preclude executive action. If the Constitution requires the President
to obtain congressional approval before taking certain action, individual
members of Congress are injured when the President takes that action
without seeking their consent even though they might be able to convince a congressional majority to stop the President. 42 The fact that a
majority might be unwilling to vote to stop or reverse the executive's
action is irrelevant, even though in a real sense a part of the individual
member's complaint is with her colleagues.
The remedial discretion doctrine is less objectionable when used to
dismiss claims of legislators challenging the enactment of a statute or
other actions taken by Congress. 43 Yet here too, the key question
should not be whether plaintiffs can get relief from their fellow legislators but should be an inquiry into the nature of the action being challenged. When a legislator complains that her colleagues have passed an
unconstitutional statute (other than one which seeks to delegate to the
142.

Indeed, members of Congress are injured because they are responsible for determining

whether to go to war, to enact treaties, to appoint federal officers and the like. When they are
effectively prevented from carrying out these duties, their very purpose in being legislators is rendered a nullity. Arguably, the injury could not be more personally significant despite Frankfurter's, Bork's and Scalia's claims to the contrary.

143.

Most congressional claims that are dismissed based on remedial discretion have, in

fact, involved these types of challenges. See, e.g., Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985); Riegle v. Federal

Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 881-82 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981); see
also Helms v. Secretary of Treasury, 721 F. Supp. 1354 (D.D.C. 1989) (dismissing, on equitable
discretion grounds, congressional challenge to regulations implementing a statute).
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executive a power accorded Congress), or have held an improper congressional hearing, or have taken some other allegedly improper action
that does not rise to the level of a constitutional process injury, courts
can properly exercise discretion to deny review on the ground that to do
otherwise might constitute unnecessary meddling in the affairs of another branch. By contrast, when a member of Congress claims a deprivation of her ability to carry out a constitutionally mandated vote, especially one that is structured to operate as a check on executive power,
the equitable discretion doctrine should not be applicable.
This was in essence Judge Greene's holding in Dellums v. Bush.144
While Judge Greene left open the door to congressional standing and
declined to use equitable discretion doctrine as a barricade, he nonetheless borrowed from Justice Powell a third doctrinal bar.
B. Ripeness
Representative Dellums and his fifty-three co-plaintiffs managed
to proceed quite far into the jurisdictional maze created for congressional plaintiffs. Judge Harold Greene not only ruled that their challenge presented a justiciable issue,1 45 but that the plaintiffs met the test
for congressional standing. 141 He further held that their claim should
not be dismissed on equitable discretion grounds.14" In the end, however, the congressional plaintiffs were trapped in the maze by a special
branch of the ripeness doctrine, which was first articulated by Justice
1 48
Powell in Goldwater v. Carter.
In 1979, President Carter gave notice of the United States' intent
to terminate its mutual defense treaty with Taiwan as part of the process of recognizing the People's Republic of China. Senator Goldwater
and several of his colleagues responded by bringing an action in federal
district court, claiming that treaty-breaking, like treaty-making, required the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. The district court
144.
145.

752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
Id. at 1145-46. The political question doctrine has been much employed to bar adjudi-

cation of the merits of claims similar to those of congressional plaintiffs as to which private plaintiffs plainly have standing. See Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990) (dismissing on

political question grounds a claim similar to that dismissed on ripeness grounds in Dellums v.
Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990)). See generally Henkin, supra note 6. Justice Rehnquist,

in Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002-1006 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring), preferred
using this most malleable of rationales to bar congressional plaintiffs' suits as well.
146. Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1147-48.

147. See id. at 1148-49.
148.

444 U.S. 996 (1979).
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found standing and ruled on the merits that treaty-breaking required
either the Senate's advice and consent or the approval of both
houses.14 9 The court of appeals, sitting en banc, upheld the senators'
standing to sue. 150 The court, however, reversed on the merits, ruling
that the President could unilaterally terminate this particular treaty.' 5'
The Supreme Court, without hearing argument, vacated and dismissed.1 5 2 Justice Rehnquist, writing for himself and three other justices, found that the dispute presented a non-justiciable political question.153 Justice Powell, concurring, rejected the political question
rationale, opining instead that the issue was not ripe for adjudication
until a majority of Congress or the Senate had voiced its disagreement
with the presidential exercise of authority. 4
Justice Powell agreed with the plurality that the differences between the President and Congress "almost invariably ...turn on political rather than legal considerations."'' 55 He disagreed, however, with
Justice Rehnquist that the issue of whether the President can unilaterally terminate a treaty was non-justiciable. Powell argued by analogy
that if the President signed a mutual defense treaty with a foreign
country and announced that it would go into effect despite its rejection
by the Senate, the Court surely ought to adjudicate a hypothetical constitutional challenge brought by a group of senators. 56 Justice Powell,
as he often did, sought a middle ground between Rehnquist's sweeping
political question rationale and the lower court's decision to grant congressional standing and rule on the merits. For Justice Powell, the middle ground lay in the proposition that
[t]he Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power
between the President and Congress until the political branches reach a constitu-

tional impasse. Otherwise, we would encourage small groups or even individual
Members of Congress to seek judicial resolution of issues15before
the normal po7
litical process has the opportunity to resolve the conflict.
149. Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1979).
150. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc).
151. Id.
152. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996.
153. Id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring).
155. Id. Justice Marshall concurred only in the result, while Justices Blackmun and White
would have heard argument in the case. Id. at 1006. Justice Brennan voted to uphold the D.C.
Circuit. Id.
156. Id. at 999-1000 (Powell, J.,concurring).

157. Id. at 997 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
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Impasse would be reached, thus rendering the matter "ripe" for judicial adjudication, only when the congressional plaintiffs constituted a
majority of Congress (or the Senate) and had in some formal manner
expressed their disagreement with the President.15 8 "If the Congress
chooses not to confront the President," Justice Powell said, "it is not
our task to do so. '159

Justice Powell's reasoning has gained ascendancy in the lower
courts. Relying on Powell's analysis, Judge Revercomb in Lowry v.
Reagan 60 dismissed a claim brought by 110 members of the House of
Representatives that the President violated the War Powers Resolution

by his 1987 decision to use U.S. naval ships to escort reflagged Kuwaiti
vessels in the Persian Gulf.61 Judge Revercomb indicated that he
would have adjudicated the dispute had Congress enacted a resolution

stating that "hostilities" existed in the Persian Gulf, thereby triggering
1 62
the resolution, and the President still refused to comply with it.

Judge Joyce Hans Green reached an identical conclusion in dismissing
a congressional challenge to the executive's dispatch of advisors to El

Salvador. 163 Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg also relied upon Justice Powell's opinion in a case challenging aid to the Nicaraguan contras.""
The most extensive elaboration of Powell's reasoning was articulated by Judge Harold Greene in Dellums v. Bush.16 5 Refusing to grant

the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, Greene required that
the plaintiffs:
158. Id. at 997-98 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell did not specify what formal action was necessary to create a "confrontation:" For example, whether, a majority vote expressing
opposition to executive action was necessary, or whether some other action such as voting to authorize a lawsuit would suffice. For an argument that either a joint resolution, or judicial notice
that a relevant majority has authorized a lawsuit, or a suit joined by bipartisan leadership would
suffice, see Blumoff, supra note 35, at 341.
159. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 998 (Powell, J., concurring). One might, of course, interpret
Justice Powell to mean a "relevant majority", that is, the number constitutionally required to take
or to block presidential action in any given case. Thus, for example, as to Goldwater's assertion
that treaty-breaking required the same two-thirds Senate vote as treaty-making, the relevant majority would be 34 Senators (the number sufficient to prevent treaty ratification). To determine,
however, that less than a majority of the Senate was necessary to create a confrontation would
have required determining the merits of the dispute.
160. 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987).
161. Id. at 341.
162. Id.
163. See Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), affid, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C.
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984).
164. See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
165. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
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be or represent a majority of the Members of the Congress: the majority of the
body that under the Constitution is the only one competent to declare war, and
therefore also the one with the ability to seek an order from the courts to prevent
anyone else, i.e. the Executive, from in effect declaring war. 1"

In Judge Greene's view, congressional standing was proper because the claimed injury was the deprivation of a constitutionally mandated duty or right to vote for or against a declaration of war.167 Furthermore, Judge Greene viewed the plaintiffs' injury as real, traceable
to the President's actions, and likely to be redressed by a decision requiring such a vote before hostilities commenced.'" 8 He maintained
that the court should not dismiss in its remedial discretion because the
suit represented neither an "intra-congressional" battle, nor an attempt
to gain a ruling that a statute was unconstitutional. Instead, the controversy was, in his view, one truly between the branches, and genuine
relief was not available from the plaintiffs' colleagues. 69
True, further action from colleagues such as a "joint resolution
counselling the President to refrain from attacking Iraq without a congressional declaration of war" might make the action more concrete,
and thus satisfy Powell's concern about ripeness.1 ° The need for judicial restraint, however, did not arise from the possibility that this further playing out of the political process might resolve the dispute. Indeed, a joint resolution probably would not stop the President from
attacking if he believed, as he had many times asserted, that a declaration was not constitutionally required. Furthermore, the so-called
"'remedies' of cutting off funding to the military or impeaching the
President" were not available "either politically or practically," and
hence, the court asserted, their purported availability did not mandate
discretionary dismissal.' 7 ' Moreover, such "remedies" would not afford
the relief requested from the court, which was the "opportunity to dethe wisdom of initiating a military attack" before
bate and vote on
72
starting a war.'
Although the court concluded that "in principle, an injunction
may issue at the request of Members of Congress to prevent the conduct of a war which is about to be carried on without congressional
Id. at 1151.
167. Id. at 1147-48.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1148-49.
166.

170. Id. at 1149.
171. Id.
172. Id.

19921

CONGRESSIONAL LAWSUITS

authorization," 17 3 it refused to grant such an injunction because the
matter was, in its view, unripe, pursuant to Justice Powell's concurrence in Goldwater.174 Congress had failed to bring the interbranch dispute to a head by making clear its position on "whether it deems such a
declaration [of war] necessary. .
Until it did, it had not reached
an "impasse" with the President. What, asked the court, if it enjoined
executive action without congressional assent and it turned out that a
legislative majority either believed the President constitutionally free to
act without their assent, or were content to leave the "diplomatically
and politically delicate decision" to him? It would not do, the court
declared, to "force a choice upon the Congress. "17
Judge Greene's decision was a masterful political compromise. He
undoubtedly recognized that Congress was at least partially to blame
for the executive's action due to its failure to assert more aggressively
its constitutional prerogatives.1 7 His opinion may well have been an
attempt to goad Congress into fulfilling its responsibilities. In asserting
that he would assert jurisdiction if Congress acted, Greene highlighted
the main advantage of Powell's ripeness approach: It places the burden
on Congress to shoulder some responsibility before the courts will
intervene.
Furthermore, Greene's opinion probably put more political pressure on the President to obtain congressional approval for the war effort than anything else he could have done. Technically, all he did was
deny plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. Nevertheless, while a
finding that a case is not ripe would ordinarily dictate dismissing the
action, Judge Greene did not dismiss plaintiffs' claims. He clearly rejected the President's asserted sole authority over the decision to go to
war. 17 8 Given the facts of the Persian Gulf conflict, the court had
".."I'll

173. Id.
174.

Id. at 1150-51. According to the court, the matter had not apparently reached an

impasse from the President's side because the "brink" of war had not been reached and diplomatic solutions still seemed possible. Id. at 1151-1152. But the court said it did not have to reach

that issue unless and until the "congressional ripeness issue" was resolved, at which point there
would "still be time enough to determine" whether the President's commitment to military opera-

tions is sufficiently clear as to justify a decision by the court. Id. at 1152.
175. Id. at 1149-50.
176.

Id. at 1151. For a reply to this reasoning, see infra text accompanying notes 184-86.

177.

For highlight of congressional failures, see John H. Ely, The American War in Indo-

china, Part I: The (Troubled) Constitutionality of the War They Told Us About, 42 STAN. L.
REv. 877 (1990) and John H. Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part I1: The Unconstitutionality of the War They Didn't Tell Us About, 42 STANFORD L. REV. 1093 (1990).
178. See Ely, supra note 15, at 1.
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no hesitation in concluding that an offensive entry into Iraq by several hundred
thousand U.S. servicemen ... could be described as a "war" within meaning of
Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution. To put it another way, the
Court is not prepared to read out of the Constitution the clause
granting to the
179
Congress, and to it alone, the authority to "declare war."

Thus, he virtually invited the plaintiffs to renew their motion for injunctive relief if Congress clearly expressed its disapproval of unilateral
executive warmaking and if the President showed himself committed to
offensive military action. Had a handful of votes shifted in the Senate,
the plaintiffs could have been back before Judge Greene in January to
take him up on his offer.
Judge Greene surely knew that a ruling in the plaintiffs' favor
would have invited immediate reversal by the court of appeals. Given
the federal courts' hostile reception to war powers cases in general, and
to those brought by congressional plaintiffs in particular, Greene's decision may have done more in a practical sense to foster executive compliance with the War Powers Clause than any ruling on the merits.
Judge Greene's opinion, nevertheless, illustrates the problem with
the ripeness approach to congressional claims. When the court decides
that members of Congress cannot sue unless a congressional majority
expressly and formally endorses their position, the court is in essence
reworking the Constitution. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution requires a declaration of war before the President can send U.S. troops to
war. Judge Greene in effect reversed the requirement, allowing the
President to decide unilaterally to go to war unless a majority of Congress was willing to vote affirmatively to stop him. The Constitution
does not read that the President can go to war alone unless a majority
of Congress is willing to oppose him openly. If Congress is uncertain,
divided, bickering or confused, and therefore fails to address the issue
of whether to go to war, the Constitution prohibits the President from
taking that momentous step alone. Our country cannot constitutionally
go to war unless Congress explicitly votes in favor of doing so.180 Al179. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1146 (D.D.C. 1990).
180. See Lobel, supra note 17; Ely, supra note 15, at 1. While there is considerable controversy over the precise meaning and parameters of the constitutional allocation of war powers,
many courts and commentators agree that the core content includes a requirement of congressional authorization before the President can begin full-scale hostilities. See, e.g., Dellums, 752 F.
Supp. at 1144-45; Alexander M. Bickel, Congress, the President and the Power to Wage War, 48
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 131, 145-47 (1971); David S. Friedman, Waging War Against Checks and
Balances-The Claim of an Unlimited Presidential Power, 57 ST. JOHN's L. REV.213, 272-73
(1983); William P. Rogers, Congress, the President, and the War Powers, 59 CAL. L. REV.1194,
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though Judge Greene was unprepared to "read out of the Constitution," Congress' Article I war powers, he was, nevertheless, prepared to
distort the constitutional requirements. 181
In a footnote, Judge Greene suggested that he was simply denying
plaintiffs judicial relief.1 82 His whole opinion, however, is undergirded
by a reinterpretation of the Constitution. Early in the Dellums opinion,
Judge Greene suggested that the armed forces involved in the Persian
Gulf conflict "are of such magnitude and significance as to present no
serious claim that a war would not ensue if they became engaged in
combat, and it is therefore clear that congressional approval is required
if Congress desires to become involved."183 The Constitution, however,
does not state that the power to declare war shall be in Congress' hands
"if Congress desires to become involved." It is Congress' obligation to
become involved and it can no more evade that responsibility than it
could evade its responsibility to ratify treaties or confirm the President's nominees for the federal bench and cabinet positions.
1213 (1971). Debate centers around questions concerning what activity is sufficient to constitute
war-making and what congressional acts constitute authorization. Compare Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE LJ. 1385, 1391 (1989) (asserting that the
President may use force only when there is congressional authorization or to repel armed attack)
and Charles A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding,81
YALE LA. 672, 699-702 (1972) (arguing that, when the Constitution was adopted, the "common
understanding" was that Congress had the power to commence war, whether declared or not) with
Mitchell, 488 F.2d at 615 (stating that "it is constitutionally permissible for Congress to use
another means than a formal declaration of war to give its approval to a war .... ) and Eugene V.
Rostow, "Once More unto the Breach:" The War Powers Resolution, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 17
(1986) (noting "it equally settled" that "the President can use or threaten to use the armed forces
without any action by Congress... where international law justifies the proportional use of force
181. Professor Blumoff argues that historical vagary and change demand that courts accord
the political branches flexibility in adapting the constitutional scheme to meet current needs and
political realities. He argues further that the courts should, for prudential reasons, decline jurisdiction to determine the validity of such adaptation, even if it runs counter to what may be the
relatively clear intent of the Framers. See Blumoff, supra note 35, at 334-63. It may be that
Blumoff is correct that Congress and the President should be able by mutual consent to permit
certain constitutional provisions (such as the "statements and accounts," incompatibility, or origination clauses) to fall into desuetude or, as he puts it, "textual extinction." Id. at 316, 347-48.
Arguably even this proposition is questionable. But surely agreement between the President and
34 senators should not be able to do so in such crucial areas of modem politics as entering (or
breaking) treaties or making important appointments over the objection of many members of Congress. And surely the courts should not abdicate a role of ensuring constitutional fidelity in such a
critical area as warmaking simply because a momentary majority in a time of apparent crisis may
acquiesce in an unconstitutional process. Requiring that such a process change be made by constitutional amendment would hardly be "a steep price to pay" in this sort of case. See id. at 348.
182. See Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1152 n.27.
183. Id. at 1145 (emphasis added).
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Similarly, in his discussion of ripeness, Judge Greene suggested
that it would be problematic if the court issued the injunction requested by plaintiffs, and Congress subsequently determined that the
President could constitutionally act without its consent or simply were
"for whatever reason content to leave this diplomatically and politically
delicate decision to the President."'" But Congress cannot constitutionally leave this "delicate" decision over war and peace to the President,
because to do so is to acquiesce in an unconstitutional act. Just as the
courts have held that Congress and the President cannot agree to a
legislative veto arrangement to overcome difficult tensions that stem
from the rise of the modern administrative state,1 85 they cannot agree
to transform the War Powers Clause even though modern war-making
has also changed. The Court has elsewhere made clear that the mere
existence of a longstanding historical practice cannot override the Constitution's explicit commands.18 6
The problem with the ripeness approach is more apparent when we
juxtapose the constitutional requirements that the Goldwater and Dellums plaintiffs claimed had been violated with the requirements Justice
Powell and Judge Greene would impose before adjudicating congressional claims. Goldwater claimed, and the district court agreed, that
the Constitution required the President to obtain the same approval of
the Senate for abrogating as for entering into a treaty-a two-thirds
vote (sixty-seven senators).18 7 Under Goldwater's and the district
court's interpretation, thirty-four senators opposed to termination
would have been sufficient to block executive termination.1 88 Nevertheless, Justice Powell's ripeness doctrine suggests that the court should
not act until a Senate majority (fifty-one or more senators) confronts
the President by enacting a resolution or taking some other formal action. Hence, under Justice Powell's formulation, thirty-four or even
forty-nine senators would not have been sufficient to establish the requisite confrontation necessary for a ripe dispute to exist.Y89
184.
185.

Id. at 1150.
See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).

186.

See id. at 942.

187. See Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 965 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C.
Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
188. Indeed, 34 senators, one-third of the Senate plus one, would be sufficient.
189. The Supreme Court could not, without addressing the merits of Senator Goldwater's
claim, determine whether and how much less than a Senate majority would be sufficient to create

a confrontation. It is possible, of course, that a court may employ this sort of "backwards" analysis of the merits to grant standing to a mere 34 supplicants. Powell's opinion, however, leaves
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Similarly, Judge Greene required a congressional majority to assert its constitutional position before the court would intervene. Suppose, however, that while a majority of House members opposed the
President's actions in the Persian Gulf, a Senate majority supported the
President's view and was prepared to let him act without congressional
interference. The Constitution clearly would proscribe unilateral execu-

tive action; but Judge Greene would not adjudicate Representative Dellums' suit. At a minimum, had Judge Greene realized the implications
of his ripeness determination, he would surely have permitted a congressional lawsuit when a majority of either house asserted a position
contrary to the President's. That he did not suggests that he failed to

recognize the implications of the ripeness doctrine he invoked.
Moreover, if the ripeness doctrine is designed to ensure that the
dispute between the branches is not hypothetical or abstract, then that

requirement had already been satisfied in Dellums. There is no question that a "live" controversy existed in 1990 between Congress and the
President concerning the appropriate constitutional procedures to be

followed before a military attack against Iraq could be launched. Indeed, Secretary of State James Baker stated that "there is a genuine
and substantial debate between the executive and legislative branches

of this government" as to whether the Constitution requires prior congressional authorization of U.S. military actions in the Persian Gulf
other than to protect U.S. citizens or respond to emergency situations.19 0 That a disagreement existed was also clear from the stateunclear whether the requisite "confrontation" could be created by bringing a lawsuit. If a legislative confrontation were required, 34 senators could not create one by resolution (which requires a
majority). Indeed, 34 senators might not even be able to force a vote on such a resolution to
demonstrate their views. And it is unlikely that they would do so (even if they could), simply to
create a record for a court that might be asked to rule on ripeness, especially since most courts
dismiss such suits on other grounds.
190. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 14, Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990) (No. 90-2866) (quoting Special White House
Briefing with Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, Federal News Service, Nov. 14, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, FEDNEW File). Secretary Baker's statement was merely one
of many made by the Bush Administration, asserting that the President and Congress have "a
constitutionally different view ... on the question of the [President's] authority to commit forces."
See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 2, at 107 (statement of Secretary of State James Baker); see also
Dan Balz, Bush Asks Congress to Back Force Against Iraq, WASH. PosT, Jan. 9, 1991, at A16
(quoting Vice President Quayle who said, "Bush will feel free to use military force regardless of
the congressional debate, unless Congress votes to cut off military funding."); John Elson, Just
Who Can Send Us to War?, TIME, Dec. 17, 1990, at 33 (quoting Defense Secretary Dick Cheney
who stated, "The President, as Commander-in-Chief... has the authority to commit U.S. forces"
and does not "require any additional authorization from Congress."); Helen Thomas, Bush Asks
Congress to Authorize Use of Force Against Iraq, UPI, Jan. 8, 1991, availablein LEXIS, Nexis
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ments of prominent congressional leaders in November and December
of 1990.191

This disagreement was not of recent vintage. Seventeen years ago,
in legislation enacted by the two-thirds majority needed to override a
presidential veto, Congress expressed its strong position that
[t]he constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce
United States Armed Forces into hostilities, . . . [may be] exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a
national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or
possessions, or its armed forces. 192

Congress thus asserted its powers vis-A-vis the President. Presidents

have simply ignored that assertion. For seventeen years, presidents have
flouted the provisions of the War Powers Resolution. a"3 President Bush
similarly chose to ignore the law. It would have been futile for Congress to restate the position it articulated in 1973 and in subsequent

statements that the Constitution means what it says: That Congress
must declare war.
One might argue that Justice Powell's approach will not result in
reworking the Constitution because it merely bars the claims of con-

gressional plaintiffs. Private plaintiffs will always be able to insist on
constitutional fidelity. There are, however, major difficulties with sepaLibrary, UPI File (reporting that "White House officials stressed ... that Bush believes he has
the power to commit troops to battle in the Persian Gulf under his authority as commander in
chief').
191. See Adam Clymer, Senate Preparesfor a Gulf Debate Soon after Baker Meets with
Aziz, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 5, 1991, at A4 (indicating that "[t]oday's Senate session began with a
series of Democratic speeches contending that the Constitution required President Bush to obtain
Congressional approval before any attack on Iraq" and also quoting Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa
who stated, "Congress alone has the power to declare war'); John Elson, Just Who Can Send Us
to War?, TIME, Dec. 17, 1990, at 33 (noting the House Democratic Caucus' approval by a vote of
117-37 of a non-binding resolution which states that unless American lives are in immediate danger, the President must obtain prior congressional approval to initiate offensive action); Donald
Lambro, Gephardt Poses Gulf Resolution from Democrats, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1990, at A3
(quoting House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt who stated that if the President goes to war
without congressional approval, "then I think we could be in a constitutional crisis"); Ruth Marcus, Congress and President Clash Over Who Decides on Going to War, WASH. PosT, Dec. 14,
1990, at A46 (quoting Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, who said the President needs no "additional authorization" from Congress, and also quoting Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell
who held the "firm view... that the president has no legal authority, none whatsoever, to commit
American troops ... without congressional authorization.").
192. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (1988).
193. John H. Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that Worked, 88 COLUM.
L. REv. 1379, 1379-81 (1988).
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rating private and congressional claims in this way. First, the concerns
of Justice Powell and Judge Greene are not really about who can sue,
but when and under what circumstances the courts should hear these
claims. Second, the courts have simply deployed other doctrines to bar
similar suits by private plaintiffs. For example, five years after Goldwater v. Carter, a district court dismissed on political question grounds
the Goldwater-like claim of several private businessmen that President
Reagan's unilateral termination of the U.S.-Nicaraguan Treaty of
1 94
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation required Senate ratification.
The district court held their claim to be squarely governed by Goldwater v. Carter despite the difference in the plaintiffs' status.' 9 5 Similarly
Judge Greene's colleague, Judge Lamberth, dismissed a serviceman's
challenge to President Bush's Persian Gulf actions on political question
grounds, holding that "[i]nterjecting the court into this political process
will only exacerbate the problems facing this nation."' 96 And third, in
many cases there will be no private plaintiffs sufficiently injured to assert standing. 19
The real concern expressed by the courts in connection with each
of the doctrines deployed to avoid the adjudication of congressional
lawsuits is the courts' role in our democratic society. The courts are reevaluating, and largely restricting, their roles in this area by barring
both congressional and private plaintiffs by using doctrines as standing,
equitable discretion, political question, ripeness, and private right of action. The next section examines this re-evaluation.

IV.

DEMOCRACY, SEPARATION OF POWER AND THE ROLE OF THE
COURTS

As the foregoing discussion demonstrated, the courts have struggled mightily over the appropriate stance toward congressional plaintiffs, but have largely refused to rule on the merits of the claims. They
have erred in rejecting this particular class of cases. The courts should
entertain congressional plaintiffs who challenge improper arrogation or
194. Beacon Products Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Mass. 1986), affid on other
grounds, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987). The plurality in Goldwater, on the other hand, had distinguished a case involving private parties from the Goldwater case. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444
U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
195. Beacon Products, 633 F. Supp. at 1198-99.
196. Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 518 (D.D.C. 1990).
197. In the case of war declarations, many potential private plaintiffs may not be sufficiently injured or aware of their injuries until it is, for all practical purposes, too late for a judicial
ruling to be meaningful.
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delegation of powers constitutionally belonging to one branch when
those powers have been structured to operate as a check on the other
branches. Courts should cease deploying doctrinal barriers (whether
subsumed within standing, equitable discretion or ripeness analysis) out
of misplaced fears about undermining separation of powers, and should
instead decide the merits of such cases. While relatively few in number,
these cases are critically important to maintaining the balance of powers properly in the modern world.
The courts are abdicating an important responsibility to maintain
the proper balance between the branches. In this part, the reasons offered by the courts are criticized. Then, the ways in which the judicial
role can be confined within appropriate boundaries by setting principled
limits on the type and number of so-called "vindication-of-constitu'
tional-powers"198
suits courts ought -to entertain are outlined. These
limits are more fully articulated in Part V.
A.

Judicial Abstention and the Rise of PresidentialPower

The arguments against hearing cases by congressional plaintiffs
generally focus on concerns about maintaining the separation of powers
between the branches and suggest that entertaining such suits will enlarge the judiciary's power at the expense of the other branches. Urged
most strenuously by Justice Scalia and former Judge Bork, this position
confines the judiciary to the place envisioned by the Framers in 1787,
and ignores the vast changes that have taken place in all three
branches in the post-industrial world. Entertaining such suits, writes
Bork, will work "a major shift in basic constitutional arrangements,"
one "flatly inconsistent with the judicial function designed by the
Framers of the Constitution." 199 Decrying the enlarged role already
played by the judiciary as undemocratic, and insisting that congressional suits will contribute enormously and without principled limit to
judicial power, Scalia and Bork view the doctrine of standing as properly embodying their concerns and appropriately barring congressional
lawsuits.200
198. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting), vacated as
moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
199. Id. at 42.
200. Both judges would probably entertain suits by individual members of Congress asserting private harm, such as Representative Powell when deprived of his House seat, or Senator
Buckley, who challenged election regulations that allegedly impeded his reelection. See Powell v.
McCormick, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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The specter of an uncontrolled and all-powerful judiciary entirely
fails to recognize the possibility that judicial growth may have occurred
precisely to balance the even greater growth of power in the other
branches. Not surprisingly, given the sixty-four fold growth in the
country's population and the enormous changes wrought by the industrial, transportation and communications revolutions, 201 the size and
power of the executive and legislative branches have grown beyond
anything that the Framers contemplated. 2 The federal government,
which in 1790 boasted only a few thousand employees, now employs
nearly three million persons. Its budget has grown from roughly four
million to nearly one trillion dollars.20 3
Moreover, the numerous factors contributing to that growth have,
especially in recent years, enlarged the power of the executive branch.
The United States' influence in foreign affairs has increased dramatically since World War II, and the President has been its key spokesperson.2 0 4 Although the growth of federal power has expanded the scope of
all three branches, the largest part has fallen to the executive.2 0 5 Increasingly, Congress has delegated to the executive branch numerous
tasks either supposedly too complex to be handled legislatively or too
controversial for members who are subject to attack by well-funded poBoth judges focus their ire on what they consider to be judicial activism in the expansion of
jurisdiction, the substance of decisions and the nature of relief. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The
Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 881 (1983) (decrying expansive interpretation of standing); see also Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Dronenburg v. Zech, 746 F.2d
1579, 1582 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (statement by Bork, J., accompanying court order); Vander Jagt v.
O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1177 (D.C. Cir.) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823
(1983).
Although he apparently prefers to dismiss complaints as non-justiciable political questions,
Justice Rehnquist appears to share the Bork/Scalia approach to standing. See Pressler v. Blumenthal, 434 U.S. 1028 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
201. Since 1790, the geographical area of the United States has quadrupled and its population has grown more than 60-fold, from under four million to about a quarter billion. Enormous
changes have taken place in the role of government, as well as the activities of Unites States'
citizens. See Church, supra note 37, at 1075.
202. Id. Judge Bork acknowledges Congress' growth when he argues that modern presidents
need free reign in foreign affairs because Congress has grown too unwieldy to take "swift, decisive
and flexible action." See Robert H. Bork, Forward to THE FETERED PRESIDENCY at x (L.
Gordon Crovitz & Jeremy A. Rabkin eds., 1989) [hereinafter Bork, Forward].
203. Church, supra note 37, at 1075.
204. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973); Koh, supra
note 37, at 1292-97.
205. Koh, supra note 37, at 1292-97.
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litical action committees and the vagaries of a fickle electorate. 06 Although Congress has frequently incorporated in its legislative delegation devices such as reporting requirements and legislative vetoes
intended to limit and control executive power, the courts have routinely
ignored these devises or have declared them unconstitutional. 0 As former Justice Abe Fortas observed in 1974,
[tihe controls that the Founding Fathers adopted are no longer adequate. The
balance that the Founding Fathers ingeniously devised no longer exists. It has
been destroyed by the complexities of modern life, the vast expansion of governmental function, the decline of Congress due to the growth in the number of its
members and, principally, to its failure effectively to reorganize its management
and procedures, and by the enormous increase in presidential power and
prestige.2 08

Many congressional lawsuits seek to contain this enhancement of
executive power in areas arguably allocated elsewhere by the Constitution. 209 The courts are particularly needed to restore the balance of
206. See generally Church, supra note 37. For an alternative view, see Bork, Forward,
supra note 202.
207. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Koh, supra note 37, at 1300-04.
208. Abe Fortas, The Constitutionand the Presidency,49 WASH. L. REv. 987, 1003 (1974).
209. Nine suits involve challenges to claimed presidential exercise of war powers without
congressional authorization. See cases cited supra note 6. Three involve alleged failure to obtain
congressional approval regarding treaty making or breaking and the disposal of government property. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978); Public Citizen v. Sampson, 379 F. Supp. 662 (D.D.C.
1974), aflfd, 515 F.2d 1018 (1975). Two involve allegedly improper pocket vetoes. See Barnes v.
Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361
(1987); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Three involve allegedly unauthorized national security expenditures and activities or failure to provide information concerning
them. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), superseded by statute as stated in NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 226 (1978); United Presbyterian Church v. Reagan, 738
F.2d 1735 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Three challenge
the failure to obtain congressional approval for appointments and firings. See American Fed'n of
Gov't Employees v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Nader v. Bork, 366 F.
Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973); Williams v. Phillips, 360 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C. 1973). And others
challenge executive impoundment of allegedly appropriated funds, executive pardons of war deserters, and the executive's claimed failure to properly carry out congressional directives. See
Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197 (11th Cir. 1989); Daughtry v. Carter, 584 F.2d 1050 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); Burton v. Baker, 723 F. Supp. 1550 (D.D.C. 1989); Helms v. Secretary of the Treasury, 721 F. Supp. 1354 (D.D.C. 1989); Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258 (C.D. Cal.
1973).
Still others involve challenges to legislative grants to the executive of powers that are allegedly required to be exercised by Congress: Humphrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(salary acts); Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1042 (1988) (composition of the Federal Open Market Committee); Riegle v. Federal
Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978); Reuss v. Balles,
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power. Yet against the suggestion that it is the executive, in the modern era, that has dangerously enlarged its powers beyond those contem-

plated by the Framers, Judge Bork and Justice Scalia have insistently
invoked the danger to democracy emanating not from dictatorial presi10
2
dents, but from dictatorial courts and a meddling Congress.

A clear connection thus exists between Bork's and Scalia's views

on the procedural propriety of adjudicating congressional lawsuits and
their substantive views of the modern presidency. Both Bork and Scalia
support a strong president free from congressional interference. 211 To
the extent that their positions about the role of the courts in ensuring
the proper functioning of constitutional processes rest on this substantive premise, adoption of a different substantive view would suggest a
different posture concerning congressional plaintiff standing. If one believes that Congress, not the executive, needs the special solicitousness
of the courts to redress the skewed balance of powers that has emerged
in late twentieth century America, one would then be led to look favor-

ably upon certain types of congressional claims. This, of course, Judge
Bork and Justice Scalia would deny on the basis that it is not simply
solicitousness for presidential power that drives their analysis of congressional standing but other concerns as well. The first of these is a

claimed inherent difference in the nature of judicial, legislative and executive functions.
584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978); Pressler v. Simon, 428 F. Supp. 302
(D.D.C. 1976), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Pressler v. Blumenthal, 431 U.S. 169 (1977),
and aff'd by subsequent order, 434 U.S. 1028 (1978).
Only a few are unrelated to executive arrogation of power. See Dornan v. United States
Secretary of Defense, 851 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating that Boland Amendment arrogates
executive powers over foreign affairs); Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (inaccuracy of Congressional Record); Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Kelley, 747 F.2d
777 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (court sealing of records); Moore v. United States House of Representatives,
733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983) (origination of tax bill); Vander Jagt
v. O'Neill, 694 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983) (House committee assignments); Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 675 F.2d 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(House rules regarding pipeline waivers).
210. See Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting), vacated as
moot sub nor. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202
(D.C. Cir. 1985); Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823
(1983). Judge Bork asserts that the presidency has been weakened "significantly" by Congress,
which is "worrisome" because "America has usually prospered most in eras of strong presidents,
and the state of today's world makes the capacity for strong executive action more important than
ever." Bork, Forward,supra note 202, at ix.
211. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Ramirez
de Arellano v. Weinberger, 724 F.2d 143, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd en banc, 745 F.2d 1500
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Bork, Forward, supra note 202.
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Doctrinal Formalism and the Public/PrivateDistinction
To contain the claimed danger of judicial dictatorship, Justice

Scalia, in particular, has deployed a doctrinal formalism that posits
clear boundaries demarking judicial, legislative and executive powers.212 Judicial power, in his view, exists "solely to decide on the rights
of individuals, ' 21- and any other use works an improper enhancement
of that power. It is never appropriate for the judiciary to "umpire disputes between [the] branches regarding their respective powers" unless
private rights are harmed, lest "the system of checks and balances [be]
replaced by a system of judicial refereeship. "214
Legislative power exists solely to make laws, not to supervise their
administration, nor to exercise any other powers, such as prosecutorial
powers, which are "quintessentially" executive.-1 5 Yet when it comes to
powers exercised by the executive to which the Constitution accords the
legislature a clear and critical if not dominant role, such as the power
to initiate hostilities or make treaties,21 6 boundary formalism is inexplicably relaxed. Bork and Scalia have typically either argued an expansive interpretation of executive power, or upheld the executive usurpation of Congress' role by raising jurisdictional barriers to court
challenges.
212. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that prosecutorial powers are "purely" executive, and that there are other "purely" judicial and
legislative powers that have not been and cannot be exercised by other branches). Justice Scalia
asserts this view despite the increasing rule-making authority accorded to executive agencies, and
the increasingly "judicial" authority exercised by special masters and administrative law judges.
213. Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985). Tellingly, Justice Scalia neither cites nor discusses cases involving
organizational and representational standing in other arenas. While a case can certainly be made
that political representation differs in important respects from other representative activities, Justice Scalia makes no attempt to make such a case.
214. Moore, 733 F.2d at 959 (Scalia, J., concurring).
215. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Bork, Forward,supra note
202, at xiii ("Each branch is designed for unique functions."); James G. Wilson, Constraints of
Power: The Constitutional Opinions of Judges Scalia, Bork, Posner,Easterbrook and Winter, 40
U. MIAMI L. REv. 1171, 1199-1203 (1986).
216. See Koh, supra note 37, at 1621-23.
217. See, e.g., George H. Aldrich et al., Comments on the Articles on the Legality of the
United States Action in Cambodia, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 76, 79-81 (1971) (Professor Bork's comments); Robert H. Bork, Erosion of the President'sPower in Foreign Affairs, 68 WASH. U. L.Q.
693, 695-705 (1990). Thus, in war powers challenges, they have either concluded that the plaintiffs lack standing or that the issue is a non-justiciable political question. See Sanchez-Espinoza v.
Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1356-57 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984). Indeed, de-
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Justice Frankfurter was the first, of course, to deploy a formalist
conception as to the inherent nature of judicial activity to explain why
legislative plaintiffs should be denied standing.21 8 His repeated reference to "the requisites of litigation," the "litigious process," "actual
controversies" and "litigious business" did little to elucidate why legislators' complaints about a specific allegedly illegal act that had nullified their votes was not an "actual" controversy amenable to the "litigious process. '219 Justice Frankfurter fell back on the notion later relied
on by Justice Scalia that legislators had no "private" interest in their
votes; they were merely representing a public interest which each individual citizen possessed in some degree. 220 That their votes as representatives had been undermined did not make the harm "private" in
the same way that denial of an individual's vote was.2 2' Frankfurter,
like Bork and Scalia, viewed litigation as private and individual, as contrasted with more public and political concerns that belonged in the
spite his vehement attack on the equitable discretion as affording no guidance and hence unbounded power to the judiciary, Justice Scalia has at least once relied on discretion to decline
ruling on the claims of private plaintiffs. See Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 208.
218. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
219. See id. at 462 n.4 (Frankfurter, J.,concurring).
220. See id. at 467 (Frankfurter, J.,concurring). Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., concurring), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1106 (1985). Yet why should claims in which we all share harm be political and not for courts,
while if harm is more particular to one of us, courts can hear the claim? It was not, of course,
true, as Judge Bork implies in Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 52-53 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J.,
dissenting), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987), that claims of
psychological injury were justiciable during the Framers' time. Our understanding of injury has
changed significantly since that era. We thus might as easily include injury to the legislative role
as to individual psychological well-being. Indeed, during the Framers' time, women could not
assert injury in the deprivation of their children, which were the property of husbands, not
mothers. But the independent role and interest of a mother in her children have since been recognized. See Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything that Grows:" Toward a History of
Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 819, 827-34; Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family
Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1135, 1142. Legislators do not assert mere dissatisfaction at the unconstitutional workings of government when they claim injury to their ability to carry out their constitutionally ordained job duties, any more than an organizational plaintiff is expressing mere dissatisfaction with destruction of the environment. See. e.g., United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
221. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 460-70 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter ran
into trouble distinguishing several cases that held that a deprivation of an individual's right to vote
constituted a harm for standing purposes. See id. at 464 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Democratic
theory posits the individual vote as a public (if not always disinterested) act. It is an act that is
essential to the well-being of democracy as a whole, and not necessarily to the individual. The
harm of vote denial is a public harm, regardless of whether the votes nullified are those of individuals or legislators. Only by treating an individual's vote as primarily a private, self-interested act
can the distinction be maintained.
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political arena,22 and he believed that a clear line could be drawn between public and private.223
In seeking to limit "litigious business" to private-type litigation,
Frankfurter ignored, as have Bork and Scalia, the vast changes that
have taken place in the modern industrial state and in the litigation it
produces.224 That litigation frequently involves extremely "public" and
political issues, brought sometimes by private individuals to vindicate
traditional "legal interests," but other times brought by organizational,
representative, and governmental plaintiffs to delineate or vindicate
highly public, governmentally conferred rights and benefits. Often "private" plaintiffs, although harmed, act not primarily to protect tradi-

tional legal interests but to vindicate political positions. 225 Frankfurter's
references concerning the inherently private nature of litigation could
not adequately explain why such cases met "the requisites of litiga-

tion," but Coleman did not, merely because the plaintiffs were
legislators. 26
222. See id. at 470 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). As the majority in Moore was quick to
point out concerning Judge Scalia's similar reasoning, this argument treats the standing issue in
political question terms. See Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 953
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985). It should equally to apply to private litigants raising "public" concerns, even those that can allege private harm sufficient to confer standing. Id.
223. Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch, The Public-PrivateDistinction in American Law
and Life, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 237 (1988); see also sources cited supra note 45.
224. See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1432, 1435-51 (1988).
225. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980)
(asserting First Amendment right to promote position on nuclear power); First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (challenging government limits on corporate expenditures used to
influence votes on issues not directly affecting the corporation).
Indeed, since Justice Frankfurter's time, Congress has explicitly conferred on private plaintiffs the right to sue irrespective of their standing in traditional terms-to act as private "attorneys general"-to further the public interest. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act of 1947, 5
U.S.C. § 702 (1988) (granting the right to sue if "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action"); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3617 (1988) (extending the right to sue for one
"who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice"); Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (1988) (granting judicial review for one "aggrieved or whose
interests are adversely affected"); see also Sunstein, supra note 224.
226. Presumably, any private person whose business or whose religious practices were impacted by the child labor amendment at issue in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), would
have had standing to contest the allegedly illegal ratification challenged by the legislative plaintiffs. Justice Frankfurter never explained why in such circumstances the matter whose analysis
would require the same abstract evaluation of legal and constitutional requirements and would
relate not at all to particular facts concerning plaintiff's business or religion should be viewed as
more inherently "litigious" in nature. For cases involving child labor as a religious practice, see
McLaughlin v. McGee Bros., 681 F. Supp. 1117 (W.D.N.C. 1988); Shiloh True Light Church of
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Despite the illogic in many instances of the public/private distinc-

tion, it is one that runs deep in American jurisprudence. Its use in analyzing standing extends well beyond cases involving congressional plaintiffs. Indeed, Judge Scalia invariably dismissed private claims
challenging U.S. foreign policy because of his asserted reluctance to
permit courts to adjudicate these "public policy" issues, irrespective of
who brought the lawsuit.227 An influential opinion by Justice Powell,
repeatedly cited by Judge Bork, expresses this hostility both to public
interest litigation brought by private citizens and to congressional
standing:
[W]e risk a progressive impairment of the effectiveness of the federal courts if
their limited resources are diverted increasingly from their historic role to the
resolution of public-interest suits brought by litigants who cannot distinguish
themselves from all taxpayers or all citizens. The irreplaceable value of the
power articulated by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall lies in the protection it has
afforded the constitutional rights and liberties of individual citizens and minority
groups against oppressive or discriminatory government action. It is this role, not
some amorphous general supervision of the operations of the government, that
has maintained public esteem for the federal courts and has permitted the peaceful coexistence of the countermajoritarian implications of the judicial review and
the democratic principles upon which our Federal Government in the final analysis rests.228
The Court has thus refused to adjudicate broad challenges to law

enforcement practices, 22 9 an Internal Revenue Service policy that allegedly encouraged racial discrimination, 23 0 and executive branch disposition of property to a religious group,231 because hearing these cases
would turn the courts into "continuing monitors of the wisdom and
Christ v. Brock, 670 F. Supp. 158 (W.D.N.C. 1987).
227. Justice Scalia has deployed a remarkable array of doctrines (such as private cause of
action, discretionary nature of relief, political question) to foreclose private plaintiffs from interjecting the courts into "sensitive," "foreign affairs matter[s]." See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Justice Rehnquist has for the most part similarly declined to
hear cases involving challenges to U.S. foreign policy, but has done so primarily on political question grounds. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
concurring).
228. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J.,
229. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
230. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
231. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
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soundness of Executive action," 23 2 and turn them away from their appropriate roles as arbiters and protectors of private rights. 3 3
Indeed, Dean Jesse Choper has taken Bork and Scalia's argument
to its logical conclusion. He argues that the federal judiciary should
never "decide constitutional questions concerning the respective powers
of Congress and the President vis-A-vis one another," even when those
constitutional questions are raised by individuals who suffer "cognizable and immediate injury. ' 23 4 For Choper, these issues are nonjusticiable, "their final resolution to be remitted to the interplay of the national political process. 23 5
This attempted distinction between public and private lawsuits, a
boundary formalism based on the "inherent" nature of the functions of
each branch, fails to recognize that the court's crucial role in maintaining separation of powers cannot be so neatly categorized. It is no less
an "inherently" judicial function for the court to interpret the Constitution to determine whether the President can send young Americans
to fight and possibly die in the Persian Gulf than it is for the courts to
interpret a statute or the Constitution to determine whether the executive branch has exceeded its authority in interfering with someone's
232. Allen, 468 U.S. at 760 (1984) (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)).
233. At least one commentator has ascribed the importation of separations of powers concerns into standing analysis to Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Allen v. Wright. Those
concerns are evident in Frankfurter's concurrence in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v.
Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1985).
234. JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 263

(1980).
235. Id. It is questionable whether the courts could long retain authority and respect if they
continually refused to adjudicate disputes that implicate the relative powers of Congress and the
President. Numerous cases involving important property and human rights turn, for example, on
the constitutional validity of actions taken by the executive branch that allegedly violates congressional power or statutory dictates, and visa versa. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American
Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (involving the President's alleged failure to enforce wildlife
protection laws); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (involving the right to an extended immigration visa); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (involving Iranian hostage agreement and U.S. property claims); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
(involving the President's seizure of privately owned steel plants).
Moreover, when the courts refuse to decide such disputes, that refusal increases the friction
between the branches, and undermines the branches' ability to carry out their government responsibilities. For example, were the courts to refuse to determine the validity of presidential pocket
vetoes, they would have forced Congress to spend time and energy to repass arguably valid legislation, at the expense of other matters that desperately require attention. When the courts refuse to
enforce the War Powers Resolution, they similarly condemn Congress to endlessly replay the political process. Ultimately, such refusal forces Congress to use disruptive techniques such as delaying appointments, treaties and trade agreements to control the President and policy.

1992]

CONGRESSIONAL LAWSUITS

property. While one issue pertains to broad national policy and the
other may or may not impact that policy, the function of the courts
remains the same: to interpret legal requirements and ensure conformity with the law.2 3 6 It is precisely the courts' role to ensure that national policy is made in conformity with the processes set forth in the
Constitution, just as it is precisely its role to assure that the government acts vis-A-vis its citizens in conformity with those processes. The
courts need not turn themselves into "continuous monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action. 23 7 They need merely to act in
their traditional role as umpires of disputes; ensuring that, irrespective
of the wisdom of her policy, the President does not overstep constitutional boundaries. 3 8 Congressional lawsuits can be one important
mechanism to achieve that end.
C. Congressional Plaintiffs and the Slippery Slope
Former Judge Bork invokes the slippery slope when he argues that
granting jurisdiction over congressional claims will enormously enhance
judicial power. The logic of entertaining congressional plaintiffs, he insists, requires opening courthouses without principled limit to all other
governmental plaintiffs. 2 9 Because standing addresses the "interests
that courts are willing to protect, ' 240 if those interests include what he
236. Indeed, many cases claiming violation of "private" rights have enormous public impact. For example, the much debated and carefully crafted compromise bill to "automatically"
reduce the budget deficit was ruled unconstitutional in the context of a "private" claim by the
National Treasury Employees Union concerning wage increases its members would have lost
under the statute. While Representative Synar and 11 other members also sued, the Supreme
Court treated the claims together and ignored issues of congressional standing because "private"
claimants were present. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). For other cases in which the
resolution of individual "private" claims have had significant public impact, see Dames & Moore
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
237. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984) (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1,
15 (1972)).
238. Sometimes, especially in the foreign policy arena, the umpire role can be touchy and
difficult, and can result in momentous decisions. This is also true, however, with private litigation
in the modern world. When the Supreme Court refused to allow President Truman to seize the
steel mills in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), and when the court
rendered uncertain and potentially invalid some 200 statutes containing legislative vetoes in INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), and when the court invalidated the entire structure Congress had
established to contain the budget deficit in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), its decisions
were surely as momentous as the decisions required by challenges to the pocket veto or to the
President's treaty-breaking authority.
239. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 45-47 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting), vacated as
moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
240. Id. at 44 (Bork, J., dissenting).
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then standing must be

granted to all other bodies that have been accorded constitutional powers. Members of the executive and judicial branches, as well as the
states and their officials, would have the right to be heard, causing an
enhancement of the power of the "unrepresentative" judiciary.24 2
Parading "horribles," Judge Bork imagines legislators in droves
abandoning "oversight hearings, budget restrictions, political struggle,
appeals to the electorate and the like" 243 in favor of a trek down the
street to the courthouse.2 4 But his specific examples are weak. He suggests that legislators might immediately have brought the famous 1929
pocket veto challenge without awaiting a private plaintiff claiming
money damages, hardly a "revolutionary" expansion of court jurisdiction or a disastrous result. And he decries the possibility that members
of Congress might have standing to challenge presidential troop commitments as violative of the War Powers Resolution. Again this is a
result neither shocking nor revolutionary, particularly in the light of
the repeated and unsuccessful efforts to use political methods to constrain presidential war-making, and the judiciary's role in weakening
those attempts at political control by its invalidation of the legislative
veto.2 45 Bork inveighs against the possibility that the legislative veto
would have been challenged immediately upon its first inclusion in leg241. Id.
242. Id. at 43-47 (Bork, J., dissenting). Indeed, almost as an afterthought, Judge Bork suggests that "one would think" that interests created by legislation or regulations, not merely constitutional ones, could confer standing as well. Id.
243. Id. at 44 (Bork, J., dissenting). It is probably not accidental that Bork, a conservative,
decried the potential failure of Congress to act because "historically they always have." Id.
244. In fact, most congressional lawsuits followed use of some or all of these procedures and
tactics. In some cases, such as the war powers cases, members of Congress believed they had
already availed themselves of political remedies by passing the War Powers Resolution. See, e.g.,
Crockett v. Reagan, 702 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251
(1984); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987). Only as a last resort have congressional plaintiffs marched to the courts to enforce the Constitution. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter,
444 U.S. 996 (1979) (petitioning the Court after resolution was introduced); Harrington v. Bush,
553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (petitioning the court after 23 resolutions were introduced); Dellums v. Bush, 752 F.2d Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990) (petitioning the court after congressional hearings were held and after 110 House members wrote the President expressing their concern about
the failure to obtain congressional approval).
245. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Most challenges under the War Powers
Resolution have boasted private plaintiffs who were accorded standing without revolutionary result, although their claims were ultimately dismissed under the political question doctrine. While
several of these political question dismissals were arguably incorrect, it would not enlarge judicial
jurisdiction to perform the political question analysis in relation to legislative rather than private
plaintiffs.
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islation, a result that might have reduced the opportunity for judicial
intervention (and would certainly have reduced confusion) by nipping
in the bud the use of legislative vetoes and preventing their subsequent
inclusion in over 200 bills, all subject to challenge following INS v.
248
Chadha.
Former Judge Bork argues that no such terrible result will follow
if standing doctrine is properly understood. Bork first understood that
doctrine to limit congressional lawsuits to those asserting exactly the
sort of vote nullification injury as was challenged in Kennedy v. Sampson.247 But he quickly came to view Kennedy as incorrectly decided,
believing instead that standing should never be granted to members of
Congress suing as such.248 Frequently quoting Justice Powell for the
proposition that the standing inquiry is "founded in concern about the
proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society," 249 he has insisted that permitting congressional lawsuits will uncontrollably expand judicial power. To accord standing to members of
Congress inevitably and improperly "enhances the power and prestige
of the federal judiciary at the expense of [the presidency, Congress,
and the states] ."250
Bork's claim, while typical of the slippery slope argument, like
most such arguments, begs the question. No flood of litigation followed
Coleman v. Miller,25' despite Justice Frankfurter's similarly expressed
fear that affording standing to Kansas legislators would lead to "courts
sit[ting] in judgment on the manifold disputes engendered by procedures for voting in legislative assemblies. 252 Moreover, courts, judges
and lawyers are in the business of drawing distinctions and establishing
boundaries. Principled distinctions can be made between various types
of claims by public actors, ones which will properly limit such claims.
246. See id. at 967. Chadha bordered on exactly the sort of collusive situation that the
"Case or Controversy" requirement was supposed to preclude. Both Chadha and the INS sought

the same result: elimination of the legislative veto. And the case was arguably moot by the time it
reached the Supreme Court; Chadha had married an American citizen, and thus became entitled
to citizenship irrespective of any "veto" Congress might have exercised. Id. at 937.
247. 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
248. See Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1177 (D.C. Cir.) (Bork, J., concurring),

cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
249. See Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting) (quoting
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S.

361 (1987).
250.
251.
252.

Id. at 42 (Bork, J., dissenting).
307 U.S. 433 (1939).
Id. at 470 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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One method of distinguishing claims, though surely not the only one, is
suggested in Part V.
D.

Separation of Powers Review and the Court's Legitimacy

Underlying the arguments of Powell, Scalia, Bork and others on
congressional standing is the view that the federal judiciary's legitimacy is undermined when it interferes too extensively or hastily in the
political process. As Judge Bork argued in his Barnes v. Kline dissent,
"The legitimacy and thus the priceless safeguards of the American tradition of judicial review may decline precipitously if such innovations
are allowed to take hold. ' 253 In this respect, the countermajoritarian
dilemma that led Judge Bork to his personally disastrous theory of
original intention, 5 4 Justice Scalia to his narrow reading of liberty for
due process purposes, 5 5 and Justice Frankfurter to his extreme deference to the political branches,2 58 underlies their hostility to congressional standing.
But the countermajoritarian dilemma supports federal court review of congressional claims alleging executive usurpation of a process
that is constitutionally structured to act as a check on executive power.
Unlike many claims arising under the Bill of Rights, congressional lawsuits challenging executive violation of separation of powers strictures
do not require the court to disable the democratically elected political
branches of government. A court's decision that certain individual decisions are so private as to be beyond the purview of government regulation disables both the federal and state governments from regulating
such individual decisionmaking. By contrast, a court decision that the
President cannot declare war without congressional approval merely requires that the President and Congress act jointly to engage our country in a war. It does not tell the branches what they can or cannot do
as a substantive matter, it merely tells them as a matter of procedure
how the Constitution requires that it be done. As Judge Breyer stated
in adjudicating an executive foreign policy action that had not followed
the proper procedural requirements:
253.

Barnes, 759 F.2d at 71 (Bork, J., dissenting).

254. See

ROBERT

H.

BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA

267-343 (1990); Ronald M. Dwor-

kin, The Bork Nomination, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 10 (1987); Philip B. Heymann & Fred Wertheimer, Why the United States Senate Should Not Consent to the Nomination of Judge Robert
H. Bork to be a Justice of the Supreme Court, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 21 (1987).
255. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 1101 (1989).
256. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,concurring).
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[W]e do not limit the exercise of foreign affairs powers by the other branches, so
much as we allocate the powers of decision-making between the other two
branches .... We do not arrogate to ourselves the power to make foreign policy,
so much as we preserve the constitutional "equilibrium" between the President
and Congress ....217

Thus, congressional lawsuits challenging unconstitutional executive
actions do not strongly implicate "democracy" and "countermajoritianism" because the court is not telling a majority it cannot act. They
merely enforce the constitutional allocation of power between two democratically elected branches of government, both purporting to represent the popular will. Granting jurisdiction over these separation of
powers claims is in this respect a "weaker" form of judicial review that
requires the judiciary to expend less of its precious "legitimacy" than
do "private" cases that, in establishing individual rights, preclude ma2 58
jority action.
Issues involving allocation of powers between the branches are
often viewed as inherently ambiguous, as lacking authoritative textual
or intentionalist answers, and therefore requiring courts to create,
rather than seek out previously determined, constitutional boundaries.
The Constitution does not, for example, specifically answer the question
of whether Senate advice and consent is required to break a treaty. In
such situations, the argument goes, the political branches should be left
to determine the contours of their respective powers, and the courts
should not intervene to draw bright lines and rigid boundaries. As one
commentator has argued, "[t]he bottom line is that it is often impossible to reach determinative answers in the area of foreign affairs."2 59
257. Wald v. Regan, 708 F.2d 794, 800 (1st Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 468 U.S.
222 (1984).
258. Because separation of powers review sought by members of the legislature is a less
intrusive and interventionist mode of review, countries such as France, experimenting with limited
judicial review have turned to that method of obtaining review. France traditionally eschewed
judicial review as a an intrusion on democratic rule. The constitutional council established in 1958
to review legislative acts for conformity with the Constitution, approached its task cautiously,
relying heavily on process-based judicial review in its early opinions. Nevertheless, the French and
other European variants of judicial review that were established after World War II expressly
permit a minority of legislators to seek constitutional review. See generally Burt Neuborne, Judicial Review and Separationof Powers in France and the U.S., 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 363 (1982).
This is not to say that French or other European modes of judicial review should be adopted.
Process-based judicial review is simply a less ambitious and more limited form of review than its
substantive variant. To the extent that Bork, Scalia and others are genuinely concerned about
preserving democratic processes and protecting popular will, entertaining congressional claims is
less intrusive than the other forms of adjudication that they readily endorse.
259. Blumoff, supra note 35, at 357.
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But the courts are surely no less able to read and interpret the
constitutional text in many congressional cases than when they interpret other broad or ambiguous constitutional provisions. Indeed, congressional suits challenging executive power typically involve constitutional provisions whose meaning both textually and historically is far
clearer than, for example, the broadly worded aspirational texts of the
First and Fourth Amendments. 60
Dellums v. Bush21 1 is a case in point. Both the text of the Constitution and the Framers' intent are clear that President Bush's foray
into the Persian Gulf could not be initiated without congressional assent.26 2 To the extent that the countermajoritarian concern is one of
imposing solutions on the political branches that are not textually and
historically grounded, Dellums is an easier case than many of the individual rights cases that courts have decided in recent decades. The
courts surely ought not, following Justice Powell's analysis, defer to the
political branches to work out a solution when the text and what is
known of the Framers' intent indicates that the Constitution requires a
particular solution. 6 3
To decline jurisdiction in such cases undermines the judiciary's legitimacy by allowing the political branches to ignore the express wishes
of the "people" who ratified the Constitution. It is precisely because
both the executive and legislative branches claim in such situations to
260. Courts have been quite comfortable limiting the reach of legislative bodies into areas
they find protected by the often quite ambiguous provisions of the Bill of Rights. See LAURENCE
H. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 5-1, 14-7, 14-8, 15-1 to 15-21 (2d ed. 1988). It is
when the power is executive and, especially, related to foreign affairs, that the courts become
queasy. See Koh, supra note 37, at 1313-17. That they do so may be understandable, but their
unwillingness to decide such cases cannot logically derive from alleged textual ambiguity.
261. 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
262. See U.S. CONsT. art. I., § 8, cl. 11. While commentators disagree vociferously about
the precise meaning of some of the textual terms (such as what constitutes a war, to what extent
the President's powers as commander-in-chief permit certain kinds of military action, and whether
continued funding by Congress constitutes authorization to wage war) commentators and courts
would agree that the core meaning of the text requires congressional action to authorize a fullscale war such as the one that occurred in the Persian Gulf. See sources cited supra note 180.
263. The trick is to determine which congressional claims the court ought to adjudicate and
why. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990), is easier than Goldwater v. Carter, 444
U.S. 996 (1979) in the sense that its claim is textually clear: The Constitution affirmatively embodies an allocation of war powers, which is supported by the history surrounding its making. See
supra note 17. By contrast, Goldwater seeks to imply a senatorial right and duty not explicitly
stated but arguably implied in the Constitution: the right to vote on treaty abrogation as well as
treaty ratification. Under my test, the latter ought be construed as a claim concerning the framework of balanced powers between the branches, even if on the merits the court should decide that
no such power exists.
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be speaking on behalf of the people that judicial monitoring is so crucial. When the constitutional scheme dictates a particular method by
which popular will is to be ascertained, and that method is being undermined, judicial abdication becomes an unwarranted form of judicial
activism. It substitutes the judiciary's view that the arrogating branch
more accurately represents popular will rather than following the
Framers' scheme as to how that will should be expressed. If the Framers' intent is dispositive in individual rights cases, why so easily discard
it when it comes to separation of powers?
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Barnes v. Kline best
stated why, in at least some instances, the courts should not consign
congressional claims to the political process under the guise of promoting separation of powers:
[A] "political solution" would at best entail repeated, time-consuming attempts
to reintroduce and repass legislation, and at worst involve retaliation by Congress
in the form of refusal to approve presidential nominations, budget proposals, and
the like. That sort of political cure seems to us considerably worse than the disease, entailing, as it would, far graver consequences for our constitutional system
than does a properly limited judicial power to decide what the Constitution
means in a given case.... By defining the respective roles of the two branches in
the [war-making]
process, this court will help to preserve, not defeat, the separa2
tion of powers. "

V.

ARTICULATING A PRINCIPLED THEORY OF CONGRESSIONAL
STANDING

The courts have struggled to find a middle ground between adjudicating all congressional lawsuits and refusing to hear any. Standing,
ripeness, and equitable discretion doctrines have all been used to attempt to define that middle. Justice Powell's ripeness approach in
Goldwater v. Carter,Judge Greene's decision in Dellums v. Bush, and
to a large extent the equitable discretion doctrine, all define the middle
ground essentially as permitting suits by individual members of Congress only when plaintiffs act, in effect, as representatives of the whole
Congress which has expressed its desire to challenge executive overreaching. For the reasons indicated in Parts III and IV, that approach
is flawed because it effectively allows Congress through silence or inaction to permit the President to violate the Constitution.
Instead, courts should entertain congressional claimants whenever
264. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v.
Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
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they challenge executive conduct that deprives them of a constitutionally mandated role, which has been designed to serve as a check on
executive power. Courts should hear such cases irrespective of whether
other members of Congress are willing to permit or collaborate with
executive
overreaching
or to abdicate their congressional
responsibilities.
On the other hand, courts should deny standing to congressional
plaintiffs who claim only that executive conduct has reduced the effectiveness of a particular vote or action, as for example, because the executive has failed to provide information claimed to be necessary for a
meaningful vote,2 65 or because the executive has supposedly violated a
statute.2 66 Similarly, plaintiffs challenging action by others in Congress
lack standing unless they allege an unconstitutional delegation of authority to the President 26 7 or a violation so grave as to seriously undermine the constitutional scheme.2 8
This test would permit individual members of Congress standing
to challenge certain allegedly unconstitutional executive actions, but
would preclude those suits not asserting a specific injury to a constitutionally mandated process designed to include, indeed require, their
participation in decisionmaking. It avoids former Judge Bork's slippery
slope by severely limiting congressional standing. Representative Dellums' suit asserting that an executive order conferring authority on the
intelligence communities violated a congressional statute would be dismissed, 269 as would Senator Helms' suit seeking to force disclosure of
FBI files concerning Martin Luther King.2 70 But Goldwater's and Dellums' treaty and war powers claims would be cognizable, because both
assert deprivations of an important role and duty in the constitutional
process of treaty-breaking and war-making.
265. See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Helms v. Secretary of the
Treasury, 721 F. Supp. 1354 (D.D.C. 1989).
266. See Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197 (11th Cir. 1989); United Presbyterian
Church v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Wilt v. Beal, 363 A.2d 876, 881 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1976) (denying standing to Pennsylvania legislator claiming that executive action
"frustrated" the purpose of a statute).
267. See Dornan v. United States Secretary of Defense, 851 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Lawmakers Join FederalSuit to Stop
Federal Raise, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1992, at A16.
268. A hypothetical example might be wholesale denial to members of the opposite party
access to information, to committee participation, or to some other requisite of office.
269. See United Presbyterian Church v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
270. See Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Kelley, 747 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
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Enforcing Legislation
Deprivation

Versus

Challenging a

Procedural

Both the test articulated above and the D.C. Circuit's current view
on standing (albeit muddled by equitable discretion and ripeness) seek
to draw a crucial line between a congressional claim that the President

is violating a statute and a claim that the President is depriving legislators of a right to vote on an issue. Drawing this distinction removes a

wide range of potential congressional actions and provides an early
stopping point along Bork's slippery slope. Congressional standing
could not become a mechanism whereby individual members of Con-

gress monitor executive actions, bringing lawsuits whenever they believe that the executive is not in full or proper compliance with existing

law.
The distinction also seems to make theoretical sense. Congressional claims that the executive is violating existing law are the sorts of

generalized grievances that courts have held insufficient to confer
standing. 2 1" While it is the legislature's special role to make laws, it is
the executive's to implement them, and improper implementation that

does not rise to the level of nullification is not a significantly greater
injury to legislators than it is to the public. The public does not share
Representative Dellums' injury when he is denied his right to vote on
whether to go to war (although they are affected by it); they are not

denied any ability to act or carry out their duties as citizens. But they
do in large measure share Representative Harrington's injury when he
claims that the Central Intelligence Agency is not fully complying with
the law, for both are equally harmed by executive failure to execute the
27 2
law faithfully.
But on closer inspection, this theoretical justification does not suf271. See Metcalf v. National Petroleum Council, 553 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1975); Metzenbaum v. Brown, 448 F. Supp. 538
(D.D.C. 1978).
272. See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Arguably Harrington's injury
is greater than that of the general public, because, unlike the public, he had the right to vote on
the legislation. But even had he done so, he would not have been deprived of his ability to carry
out his constitutional role; rather his claim would still be based on the executive's failure to carry
out its proper role, a grievance he shares with the public. While the line between nullification of
his vote and mere diminishment may not always be easy to draw, it does make theoretical sense.
Moreover, to recognize vote diminishment as injury would potentially entangle the courts in endless political disputes, because any maladministration arguably diminishes the vote of a legislator
who supported the legislation in question. While this charge might equally be levelled at my suggestion that courts take jurisdiction when executive inaction amounts to nullification, such cases
are far fewer and simpler to discern.
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fice. Why should legislators have a greater interest in ensuring that
their right to vote on certain legislation is affirmed than in ensuring
that the result of their vote is respected by the executive? For example,
the D.C. Circuit has correctly accorded members of Congress standing
to sue when the President has "pocket-vetoed" legislation. That decision is based on the theory that the President has denied those members their process-based right to vote to override the veto. 7 3 But what
if the President chose not to veto the disagreeable legislation and instead chose to sign it, simultaneously proclaiming that she believed the
law to be unconstitutional and hence was not going to comply with it.
In that case under both the proposed formulation and the D.C. Circuit's, legislators would not have standing to challenge the President's
actions. No opportunity to vote was denied; executive actions outside
the legislative arena merely affected the subsequent effectiveness of the
vote.
That result seems difficult to support even under existing congressional standing doctrine. If nullification of a vote is the critical criterion, then why should it be any less a "nullification" for the President
to refuse to comply with a vote than to "pocket-veto" it? And while
non-compliance might seem the sort of generalized violation of law
which does not give rise to standing, it could easily be recast in constitutional terms as a violation of the President's Article II duty to enforce the law of the land.
In such a case the President would essentially be denying legislators the right to vote on legislation by refusing to comply with legislation already enacted. Why should members of Congress have standing
to sue over executive initiation of war in violation of Article I, Section
8 and not have standing to sue over executive violation of a statute in
disregard of Article I, Section 8 and Article II, Section 3? Surely such
executive violations as the Reagan Administration's violation of the Boland Amendment rise to the same constitutional level as would an illegal pocket veto of the same legislation.
One justification for the existing line is that our courts have consistently found it easier to justify procedural rather than substantive
review, although there is a clear connection between the two. Judicial
review of whether the executive has followed the procedure outlined in
the Constitution seems to comport more with traditional duties and ob273. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v.
Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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ligations of courts than review of whether the executive has substantively complied with congressional legislation. This distinction between
substantive and process review, however suspect, runs deep in American constitutional law and accounts for what Professor Tribe has
termed "The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
Theories. "274
There is, however, a second better response. It rests on the distinction between challenges alleging failure to implement legislation and
those claiming violations of particular and specific mechanisms
designed to allocate and maintain a balance of power between the
branches. The Constitution does not merely provide that legislative
power is to be vested in Congress and executive power in the President.
The Framers established a set of procedures for making treaties, appointing judges, and overriding vetoes. They also articulated a set of
specific powers they thought necessary for Congress to perform, some
of which are antecedent to executive authority to act. The choices embodied in our constitution represent solutions to particular problems
and potential abuses that concerned the Framers.
When the executive denies members of Congress the ability to perform a task specifically delegated to them, she does more than violate
general separation of powers principles incorporated in the notion that
the executive has the duty to enforce the laws that Congress enacts.
She attempts to reverse a specific constitutional judgment directed at
preventing dictatorial government. The fact that certain specific procedures and powers were articulated in the Constitution provides Congress with a stronger and more specific interest in enforcing such procedures and preventing usurpation of those powers than its generalized
separation of powers interest in ensuring that the President complies
with her constitutional duty to enforce the law.
Therefore, courts should recognize two exceptions to the general
rule that legislators lack standing when merely seeking enforcement of
already enacted law. The first is the obvious case in which the President openly refuses to enforce the law and that refusal amounts to nullification. When the President expressly and openly refuses to comply
with a statute the refusal should be treated as tantamount to an illegal
pocket veto. The second is when Congress has enacted what is termed
"framework legislation" aimed at ensuring that the constitutional allo274. Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
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cation of powers is carried out. This type of quasi-constitutional legislation supports congressional standing for the same reasons that violations of the underlying constitutional provisions do. When Congress
enacts a law designed to ensure its ability to carry out its constitutional
authority, it makes sense for the courts to allow members of Congress
to sue when the statute is violated.
The most obvious and well-known example of this type of legislation is the War Powers Resolution.2 Several district courts have dismissed congressional claims challenging alleged violations of the War
Powers Resolution under the equitable or remedial discretion doctrine. 6 It seems peculiar for the courts to hold that when Congress
enacts a statute designed to enforce the constitutional mandate that the
President shall not use force for an extended period without congressional approval, an action seeking enforcement of that statute should be
referred back to Congress for the enactment of another statute enforcing the first statute which was only designed to enforce the Constitution
in the first place. Such repetitious re-enactment serves no purpose but
to avoid judicial review. Certainly it contributes to accretion of executive authority, despite the clear constitutional authority under which
Congress has repeatedly attempted to act.
B. Suits Challenging CongressionalActions
Congressional claims challenging acts of Congress directly raise
the concerns that underlie the equitable discretion doctrine. While a
strong argument can be made that standing should be denied members
of Congress whenever they raise such claims, two general categories
should be distinguished.
In the first, a legislator sues claiming that Congress has done
something that interferes with or trenches upon another branch's
power. That legislator has no standing to sue, because there has been
no usurpation of the legislator's power. Congress may be acting unconstitutionally, but that alleged unconstitutional action is for the injured
branch to address. The paradigmatic illustration is Representative
Dornan's suit challenging the Boland Amendment as an unconstitu277
tional infringement of executive power.
275. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1988).
276. See, e.g., Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987); Crockett v. Reagan, 558
F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd per curiam, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1251 (1984).
277. Dornan v. United States Secretary of Defense, 676 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1987), affd,
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The second type of claim raises more substantial problems. In this
case, members of Congress sue the executive for acting pursuant to
power allegedly delegated unconstitutionally by Congress. For example,
Senator Humphrey and five members of the House of Representatives
sued then Treasury Secretary James Baker, attacking the constitutionality of the 1967 Salary Act, which granted the President power to
recommend salary increases for senators, representatives, federal judges
and certain executive officers. 7 The Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit dismissed on equitable discretion grounds. Relief could not only
be gained from fellow legislators, but it was the actions of those fellow
legislators that Senator Humphrey was challenging. The executive was
only acting in compliance with a legislative mandate.
Perhaps courts should deny standing in such suits. They represent
not merely congressional silence or acquiescence in executive usurpation, but an affirmative grant of power to the executive. While Part III
has demonstrated that members of Congress should not be required to
gain the assent of their colleagues in order to challenge what they consider unconstitutional executive action, this case is different because
Congress has acted, albeit in a manner that other members claim to be
unconstitutional. There is at least more justification in such cases for
precluding review.
Nevertheless, these type of suits should also be heard on the merits. The member of Congress who is denied an opportunity to vote on
an issue is injured irrespective of whether her colleagues agree with
her. Congress should not be able to amend the Constitution either by
silence or express delegation of power to the executive. If, for example,
Congress enacted a statute giving the President the power unilaterally
to appoint federal judges, dissenting members are just as injured as
when Congress acquiesces silently in executive arrogation of power.
Indeed, the decision on the merits will not be difficult in most of
these cases. When Congress and the President act in unison, their actions are rarely found unconstitutional. 7 9 As with the political question
851 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1988). A similar rule should apply in cases such as Gregg v. Barrett, 771
F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1985), that claim congressional failure to properly carry out a constitutional

duty committed solely to Congress, which neither alleges wholesale failure to carry out a constitutional mandate nor claims an unconstitutional delegation of power to another branch. In such a
case, the claim is analogous to improper implementation of a statute by the executive and the
relief should be sought through political processes.
278. Humphrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 966
(1988).
279. But see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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doctrine, the courts often raise jurisdictional barriers when a decision
may easily be made, and indeed, appears often to rest on a decision on
the merits..2" Two examples illustrate the point.
In Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, fourteen Republican members of the
House of Representatives sued the House Democratic leadership, alleging that the Democrats systematically discriminated against them by
providing them with fewer seats on House committees than they were
proportionally entitled.2

81

The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

employed equitable discretion doctrine to dismiss, holding that the case
"was essentially a suit by some members of Congress against
others."28 2 Yet while purporting to avoid the merits, the court of appeals actually addressed the Equal Protection and First Amendment
challenges. The court chose neither to deny standing nor to hold that
the Speech and Debate Clause absolutely immunized the defendants.
The court instead found that it ought to reserve its power to intervene
in "egregious circumstances,"2 8 where the "committee system could be
manipulated beyond reason." 28 ' By refusing to "reserve its powers," 2 86
however, it essentially addressed the merits and found no manipulation
sufficient to constitute a violation of the Fourteenth and First Amendments. It thus held that those amendments do not prohibit legislative
bodies from assigning members to whatever committees they choose
absent egregious circumstances amounting to irrationality.
That is precisely what the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held in a case "nearly identical" to Vander Jagt's action involving the
Arizona State House. 286 Invocation of the court's equitable discretion
was thus wholly unnecessary. Similarly in Humphrey v. Baker,287 the

court dismissed Senator Humphrey's case on equitable discretion
grounds, while affirming the district court's judgment on the merits.
C. Executive Challenges
Judge Bork's dissent in Barnes v. Kline raised the possibility of a
multitude of executive officials bringing claims in federal courts if
280. See Henkin, supra note 6, at 598-601.
281. Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823
(1983).
282. Id. at 1175.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1170.
285. See id. at 1176-77.
286. Davids v. Akers, 549 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1977).
287. 848 F.2d 211, 217 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 966 (1988).
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standing is granted in congressional lawsuits. Once one realizes why
this will not occur, why it is unnecessary to accord executive officials
standing to challenge unconstitutional congressional acts, the importance of congressional standing to maintaining the constitutional balance of power becomes clear.
Executive officials do not need standing to challenge congressional
actions because, unlike members of Congress, they already have a
mechanism to ensure that their claims are heard by the courts. They
can simply refuse to act; they can fail to enforce a statute or to comply
with particular aspects of it. If a private party brings suit to challenge
the failure to enforce, the executive official has a day in court. If a
private party challenges the legislation itself, the executive's claim of
purported unconstitutionality is heard; indeed, the executive can often
intervene as an amicus once a private party has standing. If no one
makes such a challenge, the executive freely ignores the allegedly unconstitutional (or merely disliked) statute unless Congress and the executive work out a suitable compromise. 288
By contrast, members of Congress have no similar ability. If the
courts do not intervene on their behalf to enforce the constitutional allocation of powers, more often than not, individuals will have neither
standing, nor sufficient knowledge and resources to sue. Thus, year by
year, act by act, executive power will continue to increase at the expense of Congress, and at the expense, ultimately, of the American
polity.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The time is past "ripe" for courts to reassess and reassert their
role in the delicate balance of powers which has enabled our system to
288. The War Powers Resolution is an example of repeated executive refusal to implement
or follow legislation. Justice Powell's concurrence in Goldwater suggests that if Congress as a
whole brought suit, the courts should take jurisdiction. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996
(1979) (Powell, J., concurring). Certainly if the courts adopted that view, it would encourage
political compromise. But if the opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Scalia are harbingers of things
to come, it is far more likely that the political question doctrine or other barriers will be deployed
to avoid adjudication of the merits of even egregious refusals by the executive to implement legislation. For a discussion of the frequency with which Judge Scalia invokes procedural barriers to
the adjudication even of so-called "private" claims, see James G. Wilson, Constraints of Power:
The Constitutional Opinions of Judges Scalia, Bork, Posner, Easterbrook and Winter, 40 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1171 (1986). For examples of Scalia's and Rehnquist's views, see Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d
1500, 1550 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting), vacated, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985); Goldwater,
444 U.S. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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"long endure." Congressional lawsuits have increased in number because executive power has grown to vast dimensions. It is especially
important that, as enormous changes are wrought in the configuration
of world affairs and the role of the United States within it, Congress'
role in fashioning the future be carefully and steadfastly maintained.
When members of Congress are deprived of the ability to exercise
the powers accorded them, to perform the duties required of them, they
are injured and their cases should (if appropriately concrete and ripe in
the traditional sense) be heard. When courts deploy doctrinal barriers
to avoid adjudicating such cases, they abdicate their critical role in the
three-branch balance the Framers wrought by reading themselves out
of the constitutional balance just when it is most important that they
weigh in. The majority of congressional suits involve attempts to check
executive power. When courts refuse to hear and rule on the merits in
such cases, the United States as a whole, and each of us individually, is
injured.

